I’m delighted and honored to be here this evening. I can think of no better forum for a discussion of America’s role in the world than the Foreign Policy Association. Under your leadership, Noel, the Foreign Policy Association has continued and strengthened its role as a valued conduit linking policy makers, foreign policy thinkers, and the American people – not that the these three groupings are mutually exclusive. From your Global Forums to your Great Decisions program, you have helped us understand our rapidly transforming world, while communicating that understanding in innovative ways here in New York and around the country.

I can also think of no better occasion for this discussion than the Arthur Ross Lecture. The name Arthur Ross is synonymous with philanthropy in the cause of public service. Arthur Ross has devoted his time, his energy, and – yes – his resources to fostering the best new thinking in the service of foreign policy for the American people. When I was at Brookings, I benefited firsthand from Arthur’s generosity and vision. Thank you again, Arthur, for your commitment to making the world a better place.

I returned to government service a little over a year ago to head up the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. Now, as you know, government officials rarely, if ever, have time to ponder history or look too far ahead. The Policy Planning Staff, though, is privileged. It’s part of our job to step back from the day-to-day decisions, to discern the relevant lessons of history and to apply them to shape the future.

It would be difficult for me to escape history even if I wanted to. Every day members of the Policy Planning Staff are reminded of our own history when we gather under the photographs of our predecessors. We try to heed the final guidance that Secretary of State George Marshall gave to George Kennan when he called upon Kennan to create the Policy Planning Staff fifty-five years ago. In his characteristic direct and concise manner, Marshall offered two words of advice: “Avoid trivia.”
Living up to that advice remains our mission on the Policy Planning Staff. That is also my task this evening. So let me not mince words, but go right to the heart of one of the most important challenges before us today – defining American foreign policy for what my boss, Secretary of State Colin Powell, likes to call the post-post-Cold War world.

TO THE POST-POST-COLD WAR WORLD

A successful foreign policy begins with an understanding of the particular challenges of the day, one informed by a historical perspective. As the “post-post-Cold War” label suggests, we can understand the challenges we confront today only if we know how we got here.

The Cold War Era

For those of us who came of age during the Cold War, its key features are etched in our memories. For almost five decades, from the late 1940s until the demise of the Soviet Union, the Cold War defined the main contours of the international landscape. It was, at its core, an ideologically charged confrontation between the West, that is, the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its satellites. Americans accepted that the stakes involved were nothing less than the preservation of our way of life.

Our main security relationships in both the Atlantic and the Pacific emerged in this context. The prospect of a nuclear holocaust gave both sides a stake in maintaining a stable balance of terror, a balance both codified and symbolized in a series of arms control agreements. Direct military confrontation between the two superpowers was avoided. Instead, we engaged in a long struggle on the periphery of the world in places such as Korea, Vietnam, and Central America. Eventually, the United States and its allies triumphed by containing the Soviet challenge until the Soviet Union collapsed under the weight of its own internal contradictions.

Of course, these years were also marked by other international developments, most notably the rise of nationalism and European withdrawal from much of Africa and Asia. But it was the Cold War struggle that shaped our priorities and our responses to such developments.

The Post-Cold War Interlude

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, we embarked on the post-Cold War interlude. We see now that this was a decade of transition defined by uncertainty as we groped to determine the American role in an international system not defined by a single existential threat.

American primacy was unprecedented and uncontested. Russia declined as it struggled to overcome the legacy of over seven decades of Communist misrule. Europe consolidated and NATO expanded.

For a time, it seemed that American primacy was enough. The most important traditional security concern of the past – the prevention of a major power war – dissipated. U.S. policy seemed to be guiding important regional disputes, such as those in the Middle East and on the Korean Peninsula, toward settlement.
But, in the absence of a defining idea for American policy, this transitional period became a time of one step forward, one step back. For example, we made significant progress on the international economic front with the launch of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade Organization, only to confront the expiration of Fast Track authority, financial meltdown in many parts of the world, and the debacle of the 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle. Democracy spread as never before, yet in many places its roots remained shallow and vulnerable to disappointment and backlash.

In the 1990s, the wars of Yugoslav succession and the dilemmas posed by “failed” states, such as Somalia and Haiti, moved the issue of humanitarian intervention to the top of the foreign policy agenda. We saw relative successes like Kosovo, and complete failures like Rwanda. There was confusion over both the goals and means of policy.

Still, despite the lack of clarity, most Americans perceived a seemingly inexorable positive trend in international developments. From the American perspective, therefore, foreign engagement appeared to be a matter of discretion – of choice, not necessity. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the oceans once again seemed to afford us privileged security. Even in the face of growing transnational threats from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, infectious diseases, and environmental degradation, we continued to feel secure in our homeland. Preserving our way of life against external threat seemed a low cost, second order proposition.

The Post-Post-Cold War World: The Intersection of the Transnational and the Traditional

Then came the tragic events of September 11. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon did not create the post-post-Cold War world. But they helped end the decade of complacency. They forced Americans to see clearly that foreign policy still matters, and that our oceans and our ICBMs alone do not make us safe. They brought home the stark reality that if we do not engage with the world, the world will engage with us, and in ways we may not like.

So, on September 11, our innocence ended, and we entered the post-post-Cold War world, a period when increasingly potent transnational challenges intersect with still important traditional concerns. The attacks were a grim reminder of how the march of globalization has raised the stakes from transnational threats. The murderers used cell phones, email and the Internet to communicate. They moved money via wire. And they turned civilian airliners into flying missiles that killed 3,000 unsuspecting people right here in our homeland.

Transnational threats can present a clear and present danger to our way of life. They require a resolute response.

At the same time, we do not have the luxury of focusing exclusively on transnational threats. Traditional challenges are still with us and still possess the potential to do great harm. They largely belong to the security realm and involve matters of war and peace, mostly although not exclusively between nation-states. A partial list of such challenges would include the situations in the Middle East, between India and Pakistan, on the Korean Peninsula, and in Colombia, as well as the threat posed by an Iraq in possession of weapons of mass destruction.
WHY DOCTRINE MATTERS

U.S. foreign policy, therefore, will succeed or fail in the post-post-Cold War world by how well it copes with this era’s diverse security challenges, traditional and transnational alike.

You will note that I said “foreign policy” – singular – not “foreign policies” – plural. On the international front, we have to move in one direction, not many. Our programs and initiatives must work in concert, not competition. Policymakers and the public alike need a compass to give strategic direction to avoid being incessantly pulled to and fro when dealing with everyday events and unexpected crises. We need a considered, reasoned approach – an approach that might eventually evolve into a doctrine – to help us navigate in the post-post-Cold War world.

Why do we need a doctrine? A doctrine not only gives overall direction to policy, but it also helps establish basic priorities. It can help shape, size, and direct the allocation of resources, while allowing policymakers to conserve that most precious of all resources, their time. It also signals to our allies and our adversaries abroad, and to our Congress and public at home, where our policies are heading, what they will entail, and what can be expected from American leadership.

A doctrine offers strategic clarity.

It is especially important for the United States to have a cogent foreign policy approach because the United States is – and will remain into the foreseeable future – the world’s preeminent power according to every metric – military, economic, political, or cultural. The United States will continue to affect the shape of international relations and their trajectory more than any other country.

This is a fact, not a boast. The decisions we make or fail to make, what we do or don’t do, and what we say or don’t say, will have widespread repercussions.

WHENCE DOCTRINE?

But strategic clarity does not come easily. To be successful, a doctrine cannot be just a clever turn of phrase or neat academic construct. It must emerge as much from experience as from intellect. Doctrine is discovered more than invented. And this takes time.

The case of “containment” is instructive. George Kennan first popularized the term “containment” in his famous “X” article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947. But containment did not spring fully formed from the mind of Kennan alone. And it did not gain acceptance overnight. We easily forget that at the time of Truman’s election to the presidency, in November 1948, the majority of Americans still could not define what was meant by the phrase “Cold War.”

Containment’s success was a cumulative development. Kennan’s ideas originally resonated within government because they helped make sense of what had already occurred and the trajectory policy had begun to acquire. Like Molière’s Monsieur Jourdain, who was delighted to
learn that he had been speaking prose all of his life, American officials had already been speaking containment without knowing it.

Containment evolved. Interpretations of its meaning varied. Errors and excesses were committed in its name. It did not prescribe policies for every international development. Yet containment endured as our doctrine through the Cold War because it proved an enormously successful framework for relating our interests and values to the main trends shaping the world. Containment proved itself by meeting the pragmatic standard in his own right – it worked.

**TOWARD A DOCTRINE OF INTEGRATION**

Is there today a doctrine that encompasses the complexities of this era defined by the intersection of traditional and transnational security concerns, a doctrine that points the way forward for U.S. foreign policy? There clearly is a consistent body of ideas and policies that guides the Bush Administration’s foreign policy. Whether these ideas and policies will evolve into a formal doctrine with a name, I’ll leave to history to decide. But this coherence exists and can be captured by the idea of integration.

In the twenty-first century, the principal aim of American foreign policy is to integrate other countries and organizations into arrangements that will sustain a world consistent with U.S. interests and values, and thereby promote peace, prosperity and justice as widely as possible. Integration of new partners into our efforts will help us deal with traditional challenges of maintaining peace in divided regions as well as with transnational threats such as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It will also help bring into the globalized world those who have previously been left out. In this era, our fate is intertwined with the fate of others, so our success must be shared success.

We are doing this by persuading more and more governments and, at a deeper level, people to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate for our mutual benefit. Integration is about bringing nations together and then building frameworks of cooperation and, where feasible, institutions that reinforce and sustain them even more.

It is important to point out that the ideas I am talking about – what President Bush has termed “the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women, private property, equal justice, religious tolerance” – are not narrow American values that benefit Americans only. To the contrary, they are universal values that people everywhere would benefit from.

Nor is integration merely a defensive response to the world we live in. Integration is in fact a profoundly optimistic approach to international relations. As Secretary Powell likes to point out, we live in a time of historic opportunity. With war between great powers almost unthinkable, we can turn our efforts from containment and deterrence to consultation and cooperation. We can move from a balance of power to a pooling of power.
Integration reflects not merely a hope for the future, but the emerging reality of the Bush Administration’s foreign policy. Indeed, akin to the experience of containment over five decades ago, we have in a way been speaking integration without knowing it.

We can see this clearly in our relations with the other major powers. We are on the road to a vastly changed relationship with Russia. President Putin’s response to the attacks on the United States accelerated a trend already under way toward a relationship based on common interests. We are cooperating on a range of transnational issues, and it is no longer fanciful to speak of the day when Russia enters the WTO.

This historic shift was reaffirmed just last week, when in his annual speech to the Duma, President Putin tied Russia’s future to integration into the world economy and stated that the greatest threat to the international community – of which Russia is a part – is terrorism. Indeed, Secretary Powell coined the phrase “post-post-Cold War world” in the context of our strengthened relationship with Russia.

Our relationship with our European allies is also evolving in this time when there is no Soviet threat to reinforce our unity of purpose. While the bonds across the Atlantic remain strong, they are being stretched in new ways – and, yes, even strained at times – as the Europeans search to develop a common approach to international affairs consistent with their power and interests, and as we seek to enlist European cooperation in the world beyond Europe. Our relationship with Europe is not at risk. But the issues we deal with, and the ways we deal with them, are evolving.

The same holds true for allies elsewhere, such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, especially as we try to define a security architecture for Asia that meets our needs in the post-post-Cold War world.

The case of Pakistan is particularly dramatic. Faced with a stark choice, President Musharraf made the strategic choice to reorient his country’s foreign policy and stand with the United States and the rest of the international community against the Taliban and al-Qaida.

One of the major challenges and opportunities of the post-post-Cold War world is the integration of China and India into the international system. This is already happening. We are encouraged by Beijing’s entry into the WTO last November and its cooperation in the war against terrorism. With India, the Bush Administration had already opened before September 11 an unprecedented dialogue between our two countries – the world’s two largest democracies. Since then, in our common response to the terrorist threat, we have developed new and deeper relations across the board.

There are no ironclad laws of international relations, but both emerging and declining major powers have caused turbulence in their wake. How we manage our relations with these new powers – and whether we can forge new kinds of partnerships with them – will be critical to our success.

Integration applies to institutions as well as relationships. We are helping adapt institutions inherited from the past century to cope with the challenges of this one, challenges ranging from
international terrorism to the spread of infectious disease. We are doing this not just in NATO, but in the Organization of American States, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the United Nations, and numerous other organizations. We are creating an architecture for this new era that will sustain the cooperative pursuit of shared global interests even when disagreements over more limited or local issues intrude – as they inevitably will.

The Bush Administration is also aggressively promoting trade as a way to integrate more nations and peoples into a more stable, prosperous, and equitable international order. The latest Economic Report of the President highlights support for global economic integration as a top Administration priority. American leadership proved instrumental in launching the Doha WTO round last November, and the Administration is working hard to secure the Trade Promotion Authority necessary to take advantage of it. The African Growth and Opportunity Act is helping stimulate economic growth in Africa. We are looking forward to extending and expanding the Andean Trade Preference Act, as well as joining with Brazil this November in leading the next round of negotiations for the Free Trade of the Americas Agreement.

We recognize, however, that some nations and their people cannot now tap into the benefits of the globalized economy because of these countries’ institutional and economic weaknesses. It would be morally repugnant – and defy our nation’s deepest values – to ignore the plight of the citizens of such countries. And, as Afghanistan taught us all too well, it would also be unwise to look away when states begin to fail. Today’s humanitarian problem can all too easily become tomorrow’s strategic threat.

It is for reasons such as these that the United States is pressing for fundamental reforms in how the World Bank handles development assistance. And, that is why President Bush announced last month his bold initiative to dramatically increase American foreign assistance by 50 percent over the next three years. The Millennium Challenge Account, moreover, will be allocated according to criteria that stress the mutually reinforcing connections among good governance, the rule of law, investment in people, open markets, and poverty reduction.

Establishing new norms for this new era will be equally important to our success. The right to self-defense is an international norm that none deny. But over the past decade, we have seen an evolution in how the international community views sovereignty. Simply put, sovereignty does not grant governments a blank check to do whatever they like within their own borders. Instead, the principle that sovereignty carries responsibilities is gaining ground.

We saw this in the humanitarian interventions of the past decade, such as in Kosovo. When governments violate the rights of their people on a large scale – be it as an act of conscious policy or the byproduct of a loss of control – the international community has the right and sometimes even obligation to act. Since September 11, behind President Bush’s leadership, we have seen similar changes in how the international community views states’ responsibilities vis-à-vis terrorism. Countries affected by states that abet, support, or harbor international terrorists, or are incapable of controlling terrorists operating from their territory, have the right to take action to protect their citizens.
IMPLEMENTING INTEGRATION

We see the Administration implementing integration with all the tools of statecraft. The conduct of the global campaign against terrorism is a prime example of this approach. While at times the military has been the most visible to the outside world, and while we salute the valor of our brave young men and women in uniform, over the long haul the military tool will almost certainly not be the most important contributor to our success. Instead, a combination of diplomatic, economic, intelligence, financial, and law enforcement means – along with military – will make the difference.

Furthermore, in an era when so much expertise and power is in private hands, we have to forge new, unprecedented public-private partnerships to achieve our goals. We see harbingers of this in the Global Fund on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, and in our efforts to protect critical infrastructure around the world.

As the case of HIV/AIDS also underscores, the transnational challenges inherent in this globalized era often defy the efforts of any single country – even a country as powerful as the United States. No single country can sustain a robust international financial architecture, maintain the forward momentum around the globe for good governance, rule of law, and democracy, cope with state failures and humanitarian catastrophes, or defeat international terrorism. Transnational challenges demand transnational solutions.

Despite our unmatched power, therefore, working with others is not merely desirable because it materially or morally strengthens our efforts. It is often essential for our success. As Secretary Powell has said of the coalition fighting terrorism today, “The coalition we have built does not tie President Bush’s hands. It magnifies his efforts. The coalition is a force multiplier in our campaign – for all the tools we are using.”

Considering the Bush Administration’s foreign policy in its entirety, you can see how basic principles of a hard-headed multilateralism are helping us implement integration. Certain truths are already clear.

First and foremost, American leadership is fundamental. Without it, multilateral initiatives can be stillborn, go astray – or worse. We must be resolute and confident once we have embarked upon a policy. Yet leadership demands, as President Bush has emphasized on many occasions, a sense of humility. Leadership thus requires genuine consultation. We must respect the values, judgment, and interests of our friends and partners. We have no monopoly on wisdom.

Second, in forming multilateral initiatives in this era, we should not be shackled by the memories of past animosities. Ultimately, we are interested in results. We thus must continue to try to integrate Russia, China, India, the Arab world, African countries, and others into our efforts to create a better future based on our common values. This is an era of new partnerships.

Third, we cannot expect every nation to make the same commitment to every coalition. Differences in capabilities, location, foreign policy outlook, and domestic concerns make this
impracticable. Instead, we should expect our coalitions to be dynamic and embrace the benefits of division of labor. Some multilateral efforts will become embedded in more formal institutional structures, but others will change through time as specific challenges wax, wane, and evolve. Even in the campaign against terrorism we have, as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld says, not “a single coalition,” but “revolving coalitions that will evolve and change over time depending on the activity and the circumstance of the country.”

Fourth, our desire to work cooperatively with others does not imply a willingness on our part to agree to unsound efforts just because they are popular. Empty or ineffective, but high-profile, agreements do not make for an effective foreign policy. Nor can we forget that the United States has unique global responsibilities. If we are to meet them effectively, we may not always be able to go along with measures that many or even most others support. We will listen, learn, and modify policies when we hear compelling arguments. But we all recognize that even the closest of friends will sometimes disagree on what constitutes the best policy. We will not go along simply to get along.

Fifth and finally, we have demonstrated that we can and will act alone when necessary. Our right to self-defense is unquestioned. By the same token, we do not take lightly the costs to ourselves and to others when we forego participation in some multilateral initiative. We will give consultations every reasonable chance to produce an acceptable outcome. But if we conclude that agreement is beyond reach, we will explain why and do our best to put forth alternatives. We have shown this commitment in policies ranging from developing a new strategic framework to protecting the environment. And we will continue to do so.

**CONCLUSION**

The Bush Administration’s foreign policy is based upon a clear-eyed understanding of the challenges of this new century. It comprehends both the traditional and the transnational factors shaping the post-post-Cold War world. It is guided by the principle of integration, but recognizes that success is by no means inevitable. There is a natural tendency in any system toward entropy. No invisible hand makes the international environment increasingly hospitable to our values and interests. Only human hands – often American hands – can do that work.

The challenge for American foreign policy is translating our strength into something lasting – a world where our way of life is secure and universal values are embraced as standards, not exceptions. We now have the opportunity to do this. We have already begun to realize this potential. We know the way forward. George Kennan stressed over five decades ago one of the major weapons in our foreign policy arsenal was “the cultivation of solidarity with other like-minded nations on every given issue of foreign policy.” In the post-post-Cold War world, it still is.