European integration: past, present and future

How will the next steps in European integration affect the U.S.-EU relationship?

by Amie Kreppel

The European Union (EU) currently consists of 15 member states ranging from Greece to Sweden and Ireland to Italy. It covers over 1.2 million square miles, with some 375 million citizens. Its gross domestic product (GDP) is the second-largest in the world (only marginally less than the U.S.). It is currently the largest market in the world and the largest trading partner of the U.S. In addition, the member states of the EU are among America’s closest political and military allies. Clearly, the political, economic and military futures of Europe and America are closely linked just as their histories have been closely connected in the past.

Because of its size and influence, the future development of the EU will have an impact on not just America, but the world. The EU is in the process of deepening its ties to Africa and Latin America, expanding toward the newly democratizing countries of Eastern Europe, completing the project of monetary union, and initiating an independent security and defense policy. Already the 15 member states of the EU speak with one voice within the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the G-8 (seven most industrialized nations plus Russia) summits. As the process of European integration continues, it is likely that the international role of the EU as a single entity will increase still further.

Understanding the development and history of the European Union is fundamental to comprehending the current issues and dilemmas that face the member states today and the international role of the EU in the future. But it is also important to understand the process of supranational integration in the EU because in many ways it serves as a benchmark and a model of what is possible in supranational institution-building. In the new era of “globalization,” regional integration projects are becoming increasingly common. From the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the common market of South America (Mercosur), regional trade associations are emerging across the globe. None of the current trade organizations or customs unions approaches the level of internal EU integration, even in the economic sphere, and their future development is difficult to predict. This makes it imperative to understand the process of EU integration over time and its very humble beginnings to try to comprehend supranational transformations occurring across the globe.

Looking at the EU today it is hard to believe that just 55 years ago the countries of the Continent and Britain were climbing out of the ashes of the second catastrophic war in as many generations. In 1945 no one could have guessed that in just five short years, Germany, Italy, France, and the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg), working together, would begin a process of integration that would lead to the current EU. Over the last 50 years the project of European integration has undergone a massive transformation. From an original plan that was meant only to link German and French coal and steel production to a supranational organization including 15 member states with political competencies ranging from economic and monetary policy to foreign and security policy to environmental and social welfare policy. The rapid and extensive development of the EU is unparalleled. At no time in history have so many countries willingly given up so much of their national sovereignty to a supranational authority.

EU’s evolution

Throughout history there have been numerous attempts to unify the European Continent under a single ruler through
force. However, from the ancient Romans to Charlemagne to Napoleon the goal has proved either elusive or only temporary. Yet, in the immediate aftermath of World War II (yet another example of the cost of attempting to unify Europe by conquest), the idea of creating some kind of pan-European entity once again flourished. Support for some sort of European unification was found among international leaders such as Britain’s Winston Churchill, intellectuals like Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, and entrepreneurs like Jean Monnet of France, who would eventually become the “father of Europe.”

Within just a few years of the end of World War II, a series of attempts had been made to unify Europe. These included the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in 1947 (the predecessor to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD) and the Congress of Europe held in 1948 (which led to the creation of the Council of Europe in 1949). Although neither of these was able to effectively create a “united Europe,” they did serve to keep the flame of European integration alive. Adding fuel to the fire was the successful creation of a customs union among the Benelux countries in 1948.

In the end it was a much less grandiose plan that proved to be the first step on the path to true European integration. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was born out of an attempt to resolve a long-standing dispute between Germany and France over the highly industrial Ruhr and Saar regions on the border between the two countries. Aside from the border disputes between Germany and France over this region, France had also hoped to limit the redevelopment of the German coal and steel industries to protect its own producers (who were still in the process of rebuilding after the devastation of the war). In addition, France, as well as the rest of Europe, was well aware that it was Germany’s industrial strength that had allowed it to pursue the territorial conquests that led to war.

However, the U.S. and Britain, who still occupied the Western zones, worked against France in support of German reindustrialization. The U.S. in particular wanted Germany to rebuild its industry because it was believed that the economic recovery and continued independence from the encroachment of Soviet influence on all of Europe depended in part on an economically powerful Germany. In the end, the U.S. and Britain were successful and France had to find some way to deal with the potential of a revitalized German industrial sector.

It was Jean Monnet who eventually proposed the solution. A long-time proponent of European integration and in charge of economic planning in France at the time, Monnet was also well respected in the U.S. and Britain. During the war he had been quite effective in helping to organize the Allied supply line. In a private proposal to Robert Schuman, then foreign minister of France, Monnet proposed the creation of a common coal and steel community between Germany and France and any other European nations that wanted to join. The proposal was quietly presented to the German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, and visiting U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson. After garnering their support and that of the rest of the French cabinet, the proposal was announced publicly on May 9, 1950. Thus, just five years after the end of World War II, two of the primary combatants plus Italy and the Benelux countries were proposing to unify their coal and steel production under a supranational authority. Because at the time coal and steel were not only the fundamental building blocks of industry but also of war, the proposal was essentially guaranteeing that there would be no more war between Germany and France.

The new ECSC (officially launched in 1952) included four institutions: the High Authority, the Council of Ministers, the Common Assembly and the Court of Justice. The most important was the supranational High Authority, with Monnet himself as its first president, in charge of creating a true common market in coal and steel between the six member states. This included supervising prices, wages, transport, investment and competition. National representatives appointed to the High Authority were to be economic and sector experts, not politicians. They were
also required to work toward the good of all member states, not just their own.

The Council of Ministers was more nationally oriented and consisted of representatives from the governments of the six member states. The Court of Justice was created as an outlet for those who felt they had been wronged by a decision of the High Authority (either an individual, a company or a member state). The Common Assembly was a kind of parliamentary body with the task of supervising the High Authority, although it had very little real power and was fundamentally a chamber of debate.

The institutional framework created by the ECSC remains the basic structure of the European Union today, although there have been numerous changes in the relative balance of power between the institutions and some name changes. The Common Assembly became the European Parliament and the High Authority became the Commission after 1957.

**Euratom and EEC**

The next successful step forward on the path toward European unification was the joint creation of Euratom and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. Euratom was an attempt to repeat for atomic energy the success of the Coal and Steel Community and because it related to a specific sector of the economy it was, in fact quite similar to the ECSC. The EEC on the other hand was a significant departure from the past. The EEC had as its goal the creation of a single market between the member states for all goods and services. This was a much larger task than either the ECSC or Euratom and proved to be both more difficult and eventually more successful than either.

The joint creation of Euratom and the EEC represented yet another compromise between Germany and France. By the middle of the 1950s Germany was already experiencing its “economic miracle” and was hungry for the larger market for its goods that a general EEC would create. France, on the other hand, was doing less well economically and feared the effect that an influx of inexpensive German goods (particularly agricultural products) would have on its own producers. At the same time France was the only country with real nuclear power potential on the Continent and the creation of Euratom would push the other member states to contribute toward the development and expansion of France’s nuclear energy capacity.

In the end both communities were created and eventually (in 1965) merged with the previous Coal and Steel Community. However, there were some differences between the institutional structure of the new Communities and the ECSC. Most importantly, the balance of power between the High Authority and the Council of Ministers was reversed so that the Council of Ministers was more influential and had the final say on all legislative decisions. As a symbol of this change, the High Authority’s name was changed to simply “the Commission.” The Court and the Assembly remained largely unchanged.

Between 1957 and 1969 the EEC proved highly successful. The member states experienced unprecedented periods of sustained economic growth and development. So much so that Britain, which had originally turned down membership in both the ECSC and the EEC, asked to join in 1961 and again in 1967 (their application was vetoed both times by French President Charles de Gaulle). The lowering of intra-member-state trade barriers went forward ahead of schedule, as did the creation of common external tariffs. Despite the optimism of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the burgeoning EEC was headed for a very difficult period, due largely to changes in the global environment. The end of the Bretton Woods system (which guaranteed the convertibility of the dollar to gold) in 1971 led to a period of global-exchange-rate instability. In the European Community, where further market integration depended on stable currency exchange rates, this proved devastating. Adding to the difficulties of this period were the oil crisis of the mid-1970s and a heightening of cold-war tensions. By the late 1970s, Europe seemed destined to stagnate. In spite of the negative attitudes of the 1970s, the process of integration was moving forward, albeit not with the same energy as it had in the 1960s. Britain, Ireland and Denmark joined in 1973 and by 1979 negotiations were well under way for the newly democratized Greece, Portugal and Spain to join. Also the member states agreed to hold biannual “summits” of the national leaders to discuss political and foreign policy issues not covered by the treaties, with the goal of presenting a united European position in the global political arena. Finally 1979 also witnessed the launching of the European Monetary System (EMS), with an exchange-rate mechanism (ERM) that finally aided the member states in controlling currency fluctuations. The EMS worked so well that it was the springboard for the eventual move to monetary union in the 1990s and the creation of the euro.

By the early 1980s, the prognosis for European integration was improving. In 1984 the European Parliament passed a Draft Treaty on European Union that, while failing to be endorsed by the member states, reopened discussions about future integration and institutional reform. The Parliament’s proposal caught the interest of France’s President François Mitterrand. With his support and the hard work and determination of then president of the Commission Jacques Delors, a new proposal was put forward for the completion of the single market. The member states agreed to convene an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to discuss the matter further and work toward treaty reform.

This IGC, held in 1985, led to the creation of the Single European Act (SEA) which revitalized the European Community and reformed its institutions. The primary achievements of the SEA were the introduction of a clear program for the creation of the single market, internal decisionmaking reform (including the introduction of qualified majority decisionmaking in the Council and an increase in the role of the European Parliament) and the formalization of the earlier biannual summit meetings between the heads of state of the member states.

**Revitalization**

The SEA revitalized the Community and marked the beginning of what has become the most stunning period of rapid integration and expansion in the history of the European integration project. The SEA was fully implemented in 1987 and by 1991 it was clear that further reforms would be necessary to keep the momentum of integration going to complete the single market. To create an effective single market, the countries of the European Community would also have to create a single currency and a true monetary union. Another IGC was convened; this time the goals were more expansive and the...
sulting Maastricht Treaty (1992) created a new entity: the European Union. The new EU included the original EEC (including Euratom and the ECSC) but it also formally incorporated elements that did not fall under the jurisdiction of the original treaties, such as foreign and security policy and issues related to immigration, crime, etc. These were incorporated through the creation of a three-pillar structure.

In the first pillar are the original EEC activities; the second pillar includes a formalized European Council to deal with common foreign and security policy (CFSP); and the third pillar deals with justice and home affairs (JHA). The first pillar remains highly supranational with frequent recourse to qualified majority voting in the Council and an active and increasingly powerful Parliament. The second and third pillars, however, are primarily intergovernmental. Unlike the first pillar, most decisions in the second and third pillars are made by unanimous consent. This requires that the member states give up far less national sovereignty because all member states must agree before any action can be undertaken.

**Economic agreement**

Perhaps the most important aspect of the Maastricht Treaty was that it created a European Monetary Union (EMU) with a single currency (the euro) and a European Central Bank (ECB). The member states agreed to a strict set of economic performance criteria that would be required before any country could join the new “Euroland,” including limiting inflation, budget deficits and low long-term interest rates. A schedule for implementation was agreed to with the permanent locking of exchange rates to begin between member states meeting the criteria by January 1, 1999, at the latest.

Eleven member states (out of 15) joined at the beginning of 1999. Three countries (Denmark, Sweden and Britain) decided to wait, while one country (Greece) wished to join but failed to meet the criteria initially. Greece has since met the criteria and became a member of Euroland on January 1, 2001. Denmark, on the other hand, narrowly rejected membership once again by national referendum in October 2000.

The rapid process of European integration did not slow down after the Maastricht Treaty. In 1996 another IGC was held to address further institutional reform, especially in light of probable expansion of the EU to the newly democratized countries of Eastern Europe that had formally applied for membership.

Just as in the late 1970s Europe had been eager to assist the new democracies of the Mediterranean, in the early 1990s the EU wanted to help the countries of Eastern Europe consolidate their democracies and economic regeneration through EU membership. However, enlargement in the east has proved to be more difficult than the Mediterranean enlargement. In part this is because the number of applicant countries is much larger (as many as 13 versus only 3) and in part because EU integration is much further along, making it much more difficult for applicant countries to meet the minimum requirements for accession. All countries that wish to join the EU must adopt the bundle of EU laws and regulations that have already been passed, known as the acquis communautaire, or simply the acquis.

Eastward expansion is further complicated by the lack of effective external border controls in many of the applicant countries. Europol estimates that as many as 500,000 illegal immigrants enter the EU each year, most from the poorer states of the former Soviet Union (but also from Bangladesh, Iraq and even China). Additionally, 350,000 potential immigrants apply for political asylum in the EU each year. As a result of growing concerns over a possible labor shortage in the EU in the future due to low birthrates, the Commission has recently called for an end to the “fortress Europe” policy of zero immigration. This does not, however, allay member-state fears about the potential for uncontrolled and overwhelming illegal immigration flowing through the weak border controls of the applicant countries in the east.

The 1996 IGC, which led to the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, failed to achieve many of the reforms necessary before eastern enlargement can move forward. As a result another IGC began in February 2000 with the goal of significant reform of the institutional structure and procedures of the EU. Since these issues directly affect the balance of power between member states, they are highly contentious and many still remain to be resolved.

The issue of institutional reform can no longer be ignored, however, if enlargement is to occur successfully. The EU of today not only covers a much greater array of policy areas then the original EEC, it also includes more than twice as many member states and may soon include more than four times as many. The institutions and decision-making structures that were created to allow six member states to move toward integration of their coal and steel markets are proving increasingly incapable of functioning with the current 15 member states and the broader policy competencies of the EU today. They would fail completely if the EU grows to include 20, 25 or more member states.

**Institutional dilemmas of enlargement**

When the EEC was created in 1957 it included the same original six member states as its predecessor the ECSC: Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The institutions of the EEC were in part designed to function effectively with this limited membership. The Parliament had only 142 members, distributed proportionally among the member states, based on population. The Commission had just nine members. The Council of Ministers was smaller, with just one member from each member state.

In 1973, when Britain, Ireland and Denmark joined the EEC, the number of members in the Parliament increased to 198, the Commission to 13 and the Council of Ministers to 9. The introduction of direct election for members of Parliament in 1979 increased that body’s membership still further to 410, while the other institutions remained unchanged. By 1986 the EEC (renamed simply the European Community) included 12 member states, twice the original number. The Parliament increased its membership to 526, the Commission to 17 and the Council of Ministers to 12.

With such a large and diverse membership, unanimous decisionmaking became exceedingly difficult. The SEA addressed that by introducing limited use of weighted qualified majority voting in the Council, but it was still hard to reach agreement. In the Commission the goal of collegial decisionmaking stretched nearly to the breaking point, and often decisions had to be made by vote. While the Parliament was better
able to function effectively, it faced a space shortage. All of the institutions struggled under the increasingly heavy burden of working in all of the Community’s languages. The amount of time, money and energy required to provide simultaneous translations of debates, meetings and official documents skyrocketed as the number of languages increased from four in 1957 to nine in 1986.

These problems were reemphasized when Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995. By that time, the Maastricht Treaty had already been ratified, so all three countries had to massively restructure their national policies before they could complete the accession process. In addition, their membership brought the total number of member states to 15, with 11 different languages. The Parliament increased to 626 members, the Commission to 20 and the Council of Ministers to 15.

The three waves of enlargements have all been significantly different yet all posed very real problems for the countries joining and the Community as a whole. Britain’s membership was contentious, having been vetoed twice by de Gaulle before finally succeeding. Britain brought with it not only a “special relationship” with the U.S. that was initially mistrusted by the other member states, but also a political culture that was significantly different from the other members and far less supportive of the supranational ideal. The Mediterranean enlargement was difficult not only because of economic inequalities, but also because all three countries had comparatively weak internal democratic structures and produced agricultural products in direct competition with France and Italy. The most recent enlargement has brought into the EU 13 applicant countries that were formally acknowledged by the Commission in March 1998. These are Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey. Of these, five are considered to be closest to meeting the necessary conditions for membership: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. Even these more advanced countries fall far short of even the least economically developed current member state.

Aside from the obvious economic difficulties that the next wave of enlargements will pose, there are significant political dilemmas as well. Almost all of these countries have only recently been freed from the burden of Soviet domination. Most continue to have comparatively weak party systems and unstable governments. The ability of these political leaders to function effectively within the institutions of the EU must be seriously questioned. Not only will they bring with them very different political cultures, but they will most likely also have very different political and economic interests from the current member states. In an institutional environment that still requires unanimity for many decisions, the result could be stagnation.

If all of the applicant countries were to successfully complete the requirements for application and gain acceptance, the EU would balloon to 28 members. Although in the short term that number is likely to be closer to 20, under the current rules this would cause the Council and Commission to become largely dysfunctional. The Council of Ministers with 20 members ranging from Estonia to Germany and Slovenia to Britain would probably find it next to impossible to reach unanimous decisions. The Commission would swell to 26 members, seriously threatening its ability to function as a collegial body.

Broad institutional reform is clearly essential. Two possible solutions have been discussed. The first is the “Europe à la carte” design that would allow member states to select what aspects of union membership in which they want to participate. This would, it is argued, allow some countries to move forward with deeper integration without being held back by other member states that are less advanced or more reluctant to integrate. It would also free applicant member states from the full burden of the acquis, since they would not have to agree to join all aspects of the EU.

Many believe, however, that a Europe à la carte would spell the end of the European integration project since the impetus for member states to work together to achieve mutually acceptable programs for further integration would be lost. European unity would slowly dissolve as some groups of member states distanced themselves through further integration while others rejected further integration, or even reversed some of the steps already taken.

As a result a second model of future integration has been proposed that would allow member states more latitude in determining when they would move forward with the integration project, but not allowing them an “opt-out.” This model is often referred to as a “tiered Europe,” in which a “core” group of member states would continue increasing the supranational aspects of the EU right away, while allowing the other member states additional time to acclimate their peoples and/ or their economies to the necessary changes.

The key difference between the two models is that a tiered Europe would not allow permanent “opt-outs”; instead it would simply allow some member states additional time to catch-up to the core group. This model will have to be

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Europe’s changing role in the world

When the ECSC and the EC were originally created their primary objective was not global influence but European reconstruction and economic growth. Yet, the EU has come to play an increasingly important role in the international monetary and security spheres. This has occurred largely through the creation of the euro and Euroland, the new European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), and the closely related Common European Security and Defense Policy (Cesdp).

Euroland currently encompasses 12 member states. The euro is the first currency since the turn of the century with the potential to compete against the dollar. While other national currencies have been strong in the past (particularly the Japanese yen in the 1980s and the German deutsche mark in the 1990s), the limited size of their home markets and potential use in international trade severely hampered their growth beyond a certain point. The euro, in contrast, represents the combined economic might of 12 developed and generally prosperous countries.

Although in its first two years the euro has experienced some setbacks (dropping from its initial high of $1.19 to under $1), it continues to have the potential to become an important global currency. In an effort to halt the continuing decline of the euro the ECB is expected to raise interest rates by 0.5% next year. In addition, despite the fact that the European Commission has predicted that growth in the 11 countries that have already adopted the single currency will decline from 3.4% in 2000 to 3.1% in 2001, growth in Euroland will exceed that of the U.S. for the first time since 1997. Annual growth in the U.S. for the third quarter of 2000 was just 2.7%.

It should be remembered that it took the dollar several generations to rise to its current position of dominance and it will likely take the euro some time to develop as well. Much of the dollar’s current strength comes not just from a strong American economy, but also because of its overwhelming use as a reserve currency and in international trade.

The fate of the euro depends on whether or not it can serve the same purposes in the future. Given the vastness of the European market (second only to that of the U.S.) it seems likely that an increasing share of international trade will use the euro instead of dollars, especially when that trade is with Europe or even between frequent European trading partners. The new currency recently received an unexpected blessing from Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, who insisted that Iraq be paid for its oil exports in euros instead of the “devil’s gold” (U.S. dollars).

Because the euro represents such a vast marketplace, its value is already of global concern. If it drops too far, European goods will become less expensive and more competitive in the global market. At the same time, Euroland citizens will be less able to buy non-European goods because they will become more expensive. Currently EU imports account for over 18% of global trade and nearly 22% of U.S. exports go to Europe.

The international interest and concern over the euro is witnessed by the intervention of several national reserve banks (including the U.S. Federal Reserve) to prop up the ailing currency in early October 2000.

The EU’s international influence is not limited to the economic realm, although that is where it is clearly most developed. Since the Maastricht Treaty was implemented in November 1993, the member states of the EU have increasingly spoken with one voice on foreign policy and security issues. The desire to act together in these areas was formalized in the treaty by the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar of the EU structure. In the Amsterdam Treaty the EU’s commitment to joint action in the sphere of foreign policy was reiterated and strengthened through the creation of a High Representative for CFSP, currently Javier Solana, former secretary-general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The impetus to strengthen EU joint action in the foreign policy, and particularly the defense, arena came largely from Europe’s failure to effectively handle the war in Bosnia and the continuing crisis in Kosovo without extensive U.S. intervention.

The idea of creating a Common European Security and Defense Policy within the structure of CFSP was in part initiated by NATO. In 1994 at a summit in Brussels, a general outline for the ESDI was created. The goal was to increase European capabilities within NATO structures. This was to be accomplished through the development and use of a Combined Joint Task Force that would enable Europe to act when NATO was not prepared to intervene (such as occurred initially in the Bosnian crisis). The ESDI initiative proposed by NATO, and strongly supported by the U.S., is emphatic and explicit about the need for any European defense task force to be fully integrated within the existing NATO structure.

The Europeans have taken a slightly different approach in proposing the Cesdp. In a series of recent European Council statements (Cologne, June 1999; Helsinki, December 1999 and Feira, June 2000), as well as the bilateral St. Malo declaration by Britain and France, the EU has pressed for a more independent European defense organization. The primary goal is the creation of a stand-alone force capable of fulfilling the “Petersburg tasks” of humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping and crisis management (military and civilian).

During the Helsinki European Coun-
The U.S.-Europe relationship

Throughout this century there have been strong ties between Europe and America. America’s intervention in World War II and the U.S. role in the reconstruction of Europe are still remembered and appreciated by the EU member states. However, after years spent in the shadow of the two superpowers, the member states of the EU are eager to return to a position of international influence.

The end of the cold war signaled a new opportunity for the nations of Europe through the EU to once again rise to global importance. The rapid pace of integration since 1987, and particularly 1992, has demonstrated the will of the EU to evolve into an economic rival of the U.S. The recent move toward CESDP suggests the desire of the member states of the EU to gain some independence from American hegemony in NATO, even if that requires a further reduction in their national sovereignty.

Does this necessarily mean a weakening in the transatlantic ties that have for so long governed the foreign and economic policies of Europe and America? Most likely no, but it does mean that Europe is pushing for a kind of renegotiation of that relationship. In the post-cold-war era, Europe is no longer threatened by a towering Soviet threat. It no longer depends on the U.S. to protect its freedom from outside invasion. Instead, today Europe sees itself as the natural leader in the process of re-democratization of Eastern Europe. With the success of the single-market program and the creation of the euro, Europe has become an economic power nearly equal to the U.S. and able to negotiate as an equal in global organizations such as the WTO and G-8 summits. Through development of CESDP Europe also seeks some potential independence from America in matters of defense and security policy. After nearly 50 years of playing a supporting role to the U.S. in the global arena, Europe is pushing for equality, not isolation or superiority.

In fact, in many ways the ties between Europe and America have been strengthened over the last decade. In November 1990 the EU and the U.S. made a joint declaration on the transatlantic partnership. This declaration outlined the historical and continuing ties between the member states of the EU and America and called for the further strengthening of these links. It established an institutional structure for consultation including a series of meetings between European and American leaders to coordinate their policies in a variety of arenas. In 1996 this was strengthened by the creation of the Transatlantic Agenda. This document outlined a set of specific goals to be accomplished through joint action by the EU and America.

These new attempts at redefining the links between Europe and America, combined with the dramatic evolution of the European integration project, suggest a transformation of Europe’s position in the transatlantic relationship from junior participant to equal partner.
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Was World War II a necessary precursor to the establishment of the EU? If so, what does this suggest for the future development of other regional integration projects such as Mercosur and ASEAN?

2. Will a “Europe à la carte” or a “tiered Europe” work better in the future, particularly in light of the EU’s imminent enlargement to include the countries of Eastern Europe?

3. Should the U.S. be concerned about the eventual development of an independent European military task force within the institutional structure of the EU? Why or why not?

4. Do you think the EU will eventually become a new “superpower” to balance America’s current international hegemony? Has this already occurred? Is it more or less likely to occur after Eastern enlargement?

5. Should the EU serve as a model for other regional integration projects such as NAFTA, ASEAN and Mercosur? What would the strategic global environment look like if others followed Europe’s lead?

6. What should America’s economic policy be with regard to the euro? Should it intervene (as it recently has) to prop up the euro or let nature take its course?

7. America was initially a staunch supporter of the European integration project in both the economic and military spheres. Given the success of the EU economically and the growing contention between the EU and the U.S. over the future of ESDI/CESOP, did the U.S. make a mistake?

8. Should the EU complete the enlargement process to include all 13 of the current applicant countries? If so why, and if not, which countries should remain outside of the EU, and why?

READINGS AND RESOURCES

Barber, Lionel, “The Future of European Defense.” Europe, June 2000, pp. 22-25. This is a short piece that emphasizes the continuing need of Europe to rely on NATO defense capabilities.


Martin, Andrew, and Ross, George, “Europe’s Monetary Union: Creating a Democratic Deficit?” Current History, April 1999, pp. 171-75. This article discusses the ongoing issue of the “democratic deficit” in Europe, meaning essentially, the distancing of the average EU citizen from the decisionmaking process.


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