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Preventing Genocide: Practical Steps and Effective Action

**Consulate General of Hungary
New York City, NY
April 15, 2008**

DR. DAVID A. HAMBURG: It's a great honor to have this book launched by the Foreign Policy Association, whose president Noel Lateef, and its board, have been exceedingly supportive of my work on prevention of mass violence over the past decade. No organization has been more supportive. And I, there was no reason why they should, except they took it seriously and I guess maybe I think they have good judgment. But I had never been active in the organization; I didn't know very many people. The very first review of the Carnegie Commission Report on which John Whitehead served so well, was done by Noel Lateef, at some length, in the Christian Science Monitor, and we were all thrilled. He got it right.

The book is dedicated with deep respect to a set of people whose insightful commitment to prevention of genocide inspired and sustained the whole enterprise. Several of them are here today, and Noel Lateef is one to whom this book is dedicated. Dr. Jack Barchas is here, the chairman of psychiatry at Cornell, and my patron saint for a long time. And of course Dr. Betty Hamburg has made possible everything I've ever been able to do.

I'm also very grateful to be introduced by Bob Orr on behalf of the Secretary General, and in effect the previous Secretary General as well. Bob Orr has served both Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-Moon very well. I've had the privilege of seeing close up what he's done. And I know of no one in the U.N. system who's been more effective to implement the very sound, wonderful, visionary values of Kofi Anna and Ban Ki-Moon and Bob Orr. And in fact, in respect to the unit we've been able to create at the U.N. in the past few years, on prevention of genocide, it was Bob Orr, I would say, more than any other individual, who did what had to be done in the internal work of the organization, to get it done.

There were so many people who said to me, you know, in a very funny way, "Why do you spend your time on it? You know it's frustrating. You know that it will not be possible to get a distinct unit established in the U.N., there's all kind of internal opposition and bureaucratic politics and what have you." And I felt we had to try, especially since the Secretary General was so deeply committed to trying, too. And he took more bruises than I did. But without Bob Orr, I don't think it would have been possible.

Now, from here on, I will not be spontaneous. It was once said about a well-known conductor, and some of you heard me refer to this without identifying the conductor, that he, it's remarkable, he conducts without a score, but not from memory either. [laughter] So, the result is not always optimal, and therefore in an effort to avoid that kind of problem, and to be reasonably efficient, I'm going to read from here on.

It is a very big subject, a very difficult subject. There's very little systematic in deputy literature on this subject. To a very considerable extent, in the wonderful, let's say "Holocaust" literature, great people like Eli Wiesel, beautiful descriptions of the experiences of those who died and those who survived. There are a number of excellent analytic studies of individual genocides. But it has been a daunting task to even try to tackle the problem from a preventive point of view.

And Eli Wiesel who's written a beautiful few pages at the outset of this book, said to me from time to time, over the years when I was getting up the courage to work on this, to take the previous prevention work all the way to the ultimate degradation that is genocide. He said, "Those of us who've been in this field have desperately hoped that someday, somehow, someone would come up with a preventive approach. We haven't known how to do it. We've known, with the greatest urgency that it needs to be done, but we haven't known ourselves how to do it." And he kept pushing me forward to do it. And he said recently, "Since it's the only systematic, in-depth book on the subject, you must assume it's the bet one." [laughter] And it occurred to me it might also be the worse one, but we'll see about that later.

Now as Bob said, there is a widely accepted belief among political leaders that genocide cannot be detected until the last minute, and then the only recourse is a large scale military response that no country or organization is willing or able to undertake. But research shows that early signals of a dangerous trend toward mass violence always provide ample time, years or decades. Not weeks, not months, certainly not days. One world leader told me, "You never can know until a few days in advance," that's so cockeyed that it's almost beyond imagination. But we understand it better now because there's been access to a lot of archives in Germany, in Russia, even in Cambodia, that go much deeper into it.

But much of it was open and well-known without going into the archives. You don't need satellites from open sources, multiple open-sources, it's possible to identify gradually growing danger of mass violence. Now, you can't say for sure it's going to be a genocide. You could pretty sure say it's going to be mass violence if they stay on the track they're on, but you know, and it happens, it's a peculiarity of mine, I don't like mass murder in any form, so I'm not greatly moved by whether it is genocide you're preventing, or something close to genocide, although the book of course emphasizes genocide and gives a number of case history. Of the Armenians, of the Holocaust, of Rwanda, and then the genocide that almost was but wasn't quite, and which teaches us a lot of lessons about actual avoiding of a genocide, namely South Africa.

So I am focusing on genocide, and yet the real title of this should be "Preventing Genocide and Related Mass Violence." Mass violence does occur in countries or regions in trouble and in need of international help. The trouble usually combines political, social, cultural, psychological and economic components, a situation that exacerbates inter-group tensions and can be exploited by ruthless leaders who gain and consolidate power through incitement to violence against vulnerable scapegoats. This leads me to say what is distinctive about this book, what does it propose?

One, organized, proactive help to countries in trouble, if possible, prior to any killing. Two, use the ample warning time to act before blood flows. Three, formulate and disseminate specific response options and contingency plans, to deal with early warning signals. Four, draw together many tools, strategies and practices to prevent mass violence. And five, clarify what various international organizations can use those tools, strategies and practices most effectively, with special attention to the established democracies. Six, organize a comprehensive program of preventing mass violence through cooperation among organizations that share mechanisms for ongoing conflict resolution below the threshold of mass violence, with models for assisting democratic, socioeconomic development that meets basic human needs. Seven, establish two cooperating international centers for the prevention of genocide, each with a base in a strong international institution, and links to other organizations that offer complimentary strengths and cooperative opportunities. Eight, expand those links in the next one or two decades to create a worldwide network of cooperating entities for preventing mass violence. Nine, build a constituency for prevention, especially of course in the democratic countries through comprehensive public education on the necessity and feasibility of prevention. That comes to nine, you might call them Hamburg's Nine Commandments. I wanted to get it to ten, but I couldn't make it. [laughter]

Genocide's arise from organized state policy, that require the cooperation of many people over a period of years. Every modern case of genocide has been preceded by a mass media propaganda campaign directed by political leaders.

Ethnic cleansing and genocide even more so, rely upon control of wide-ranging broadcast media, to spread virulent, persistent and flagrant propaganda that glorifies a nation or ethnic or religious group, and then justifies harm to the putative enemy, typically a helpless enemy. Incitement works when prejudice already exists, and the listeners are receptive to it. Political leaders make genocide possible by stoking hatred, but they do not act alone. In addition to generating popular backing, leaders must also be supported by the machinery of the state, dominant political party, the police, paramilitary, and military forces, and even on sad, very sad to say, professionals such as lawyers, doctors, professors and engineers.

Achieving this support takes time, and makes the progression of events toward genocide gradual. Small but frequent and consistent harmful acts become familiar and more acceptable, especially if they meet no vigorous response from inside or outside the country. Then, larger harmful actions begin, and at this late stage, can move very rapidly, as in Rwanda in 1994. The common belief about Rwanda is it happened like that. I happened personally to see a piece of it in 1972, and it actually, the first serious outbreak of killing was in 1959. So there are decades, about three decades, of you know, small massacres, big massacres, you know, gigantic massacres. So it came to a climax rapidly in 1994, but there was somewhere in the bowels of the State Department there's a report I gave in '74 when I suddenly encountered 60,000 refugees from Burundi, same problem Burundi/Rwanda, the Hutu/Tutsi problem, with incendiary leaders.

I came, I had nothing to do with this field at that time, I was engaged in biomedical research and behavioral biology, in Africa. But, the 60,000 refugees came upon our research camp virtually overnight. I went to the State Department, reported it to the Rwandan/Burundi desk, and somewhere in the files it's there. They said to me, "We believe you, but the people on the seventh floor won't pay any attention." John Whitehead knows very well what the seventh floor is, it's like the 38th floor at the U.N.. And they were of course right, and nobody paid any attention, and I didn't expect them to.

Now, let's talk for a few minutes about the pillars of prevention. This is, it's very ambitious, and difficult and long term, I'm talking decades or generations for the most part, except for the first one. But these are the things that can actually be done, and probably must be done, if we ever come to the day when "never again" will be more than a cliché or a bumper sticker, tragic as it is.

The first pillar is the one that has the quickest action, and you saw it with Kofi Annan in Kenya a few weeks ago: proactive help to countries in trouble. Governments, mainly the growing community of established democracies, and intergovernmental organizations, especially the U.N. and the E.U., and some non-governmental bodies, can establish permanent mechanisms for settling conflicts peacefully, before violence occurs. And collaborating ongoing

programs of international help that build the capacity of groups to resolve their own grievances internally, without bloodshed.

Such organizations need dedicated units for preventive diplomacy, whose personnel combine skill in early conflict resolution, with up-to-date knowledge of a particular region. They need a roster of experts on call and periodic updating of the knowledge of the experts. These organizations must form networks that keep in close touch with all regions of the world, so as to be able to respond with empathy and concern, in offering early, ongoing action to prevent mass violence. Tackling serious grievances as early as possible, denies political demagogues the long, rankling discontent that makes incitement to violence easier.

This requires continuous exchange of accurate information on warnings of serious trouble between groups or nations, especially intensive, recurrent hate speech, and periodic outbursts of violence, even initially on a small scale. Military capability may be essential for certain purposes, not to fight a war, but to separate the adversaries as should have been done in Rwanda, and could have been done in Rwanda. And thereby allow space for mediation by a third party, and then in due course negotiation between the adversarial groups. But the proactive help approach minimizes the need for military action.

We can come back to the military question if you want, I've had a fair amount of experience with it. A lot of people when they hear about genocide think of an ongoing slaughter of such a scale that it would require fighting a war to stop it. And that's not the way to think about it. When it reaches that point, it's exceedingly difficult to do anything useful. Humpty Dumpty is smashed, there are better and worse ways to put Humpty Dumpty back together again, but the focus needs to be on preventing it before Humpty Dumpty is smashed, long before.

Okay, recent studies agree on some key points of preventive diplomacy, a number of which were illustrated by Kofi Annan in Kenya last month: reject wishful thinking; recognize dangers early, get the facts straight from multiple credible sources, and be sure they include the history of the particular danger and the culture of the parties involved; offer fair-minded and trustworthy mediation early, third party, before attitudes and positions harden; pool strengths, share burdens and divide labor among national and multilateral bodies according to their capacity and motivation to help achieve peaceful relations; foster widespread public understanding of conflict resolution and violence prevention; formulate and promote superordinate goals that opposing groups share, but can obtain only, only by cooperation leading to mutual benefit; use economic and technical leverage, both carrots and sticks, to indicate what can be gained by peaceful settlement, what incentives exist for peaceful settlement, and what can be lost by violence; identify and support moderate, pragmatic, local leaders, especially democratic reformers, who exist almost all over the world, integrate them into like-minded international

networks that can help and support them, since their position is often precarious; bear in mind that negotiators and their constituencies have a need for respect and dignity; help negotiators strengthen cooperation among the factions within their own group, and guard against spoilers, maintain an atmosphere of shared humanity and hope for mutual accommodation.

I didn't count that time, but it comes to nine commandments again. I just can't get over that threshold, but I'll try later. So that's pillar one, proactive help with special attention to preventive diplomacy. Pillar two flows naturally from number one: fostering democracy. And you see that in Kenya, too. Very serious efforts, I don't know how they'll come out, there's no guarantee. But very serious efforts to build democracy where there wasn't much democracy before. There was a little, Kenya's a country I know well, I worked there for some years. Its democratic prowess was always overrated. It was wishful thinking on our part. We wanted to take Kenya as the model democracy that in a decade, a very distinguished person said to me in those days, "In a decade, after independence, Kenya will be a fully consolidated democracy." And I said, "That doesn't seem possible to me." We shouldn't expect miracles, it takes a long time. Research literature on democratic transitions shows that consolidation if all goes well, takes about 20-25 years.

And somebody's got to help during that time, and no single person or organization can do it. It's inherently multilateral. Fostering democracy around the world will fail unless there are effective multilateral organizations. With all of its limitations, and we've seen some close up in recent years, democracy is still very important in preventing mass violence, including genocide. Aggression occurs most readily in authoritarian states where leaders can lie, inflame, coerce an unresisting public, especially a public already chafing under repression injustice and hatred. Democracies, even with their periodic regressions, protect human rights better than non-democratic societies, and fairly elected officials are less likely to engage in large-scale human rights violations, a tradition first step toward genocide.

Democracies must have systematic, fair procedures of governance that are based on consent of the governed. And most of them do, to greater or lesser extent. There has to be some kind of culture of fairness, however vaguely formulated, that exists for a democracy to be effective. That's one of the ways in which ubiquitous human conflicts, even democracies, are kept below the threshold of mass violence. Surveys show those basic principles of democracy are attractive all over the world, even in poor developing countries. But the application of those principals in conflicts is a long term, ambitious goal, not an immediate result when democracy is imposed by force. And I have to emphasize that point: imposing democracy by force rarely works, you know, unless you're prepared and have the capacity to stay for many years, as we and some of our allies did in Germany and Japan after World War II.

Even then, if you look at the Marshall Plan, how early it was that we said to the Europeans, "We want you to develop your own plan. We'll give you guidance, we'll give you parameters, but we want you to develop your own plan," and we meant that and we stuck with it. So-- but that was a world war for god's sake, and I don't think anybody's looking for a world war in order to impose democracy. I hope not.

Another thing, another common misunderstanding about democracy promotion, is that once you have an election, all will quickly be well. That rarely is the case. A single, premature election, as we've seen in recent years, is very dangerous. But the literature, a very good scholarly literature on democratic transitions, is full of that. The transition to a fully viable, open, democratic society can be stormy. Usually is, to some degree, during the first decade. New emerging and fragile democracies need cooperative, respectful and sustained international help to strengthen their political and civic infrastructure. That is the sort of help the fragile Weimar Republic did not get, with immensely tragic results in the emergence of the Nazi regime.

Today, the democratic community has established special funds to support technical assistance, financial aid and social exchanges, to strengthen requisite leaders, processes and institutions, including widespread education of citizens about how democracy actually works. As I said, it was a vaguely formulated notion all over the world, even in very poor countries, that democracy's a good thing. It's something to do with opportunity, with freedom, with lack of torture, something like that. But how it actually works is by no means understood. And requires like, you know, if you believe in human learning capacities, and people who are motivated to get toward democracy, can learn how to do it.

Pillar three is fostering equitable, and I underline equitable, socioeconomic development. And I underline socioeconomic. We used to talk about economic development, meaning economic growth was all that mattered. Economic growth alone is necessary but won't get you very far. Economic development is a vital partner of democratic political development. Worldwide democratic socioeconomic development is humanities best hope for producing conditions that are unfavorable to mass violence, and is a much more practical goal than it was only a few decades ago.

The essential ingredients for development, in my view, are actually simple, although complicated to apply: knowledge, skills, freedom and health. Health was only recently added, it used to be thought of as a luxury, tacked on after development is largely successful. But we see from the AIDS epidemic, and other similar problems, that won't work. If you have a decimated population, you must act promptly in order to provide something like a vigorous dynamic population, that can actually do economic growth. So its knowledge, skills, freedom and health, and that can be achieved by sustained

international cooperation, once again, that draws upon modern science and technology.

Most crucial for poor countries is investment in human and social capital, to build a vigorous, dynamic population, through health and education. Again, when I first learned a little something about economic development 20-30 years ago, health and education did not get a high priority. Now they do. There's been a real transformation, that without a healthy and vigorous and well-educated population, you're not likely to get much equitable economic development.

Inclusive political participation, basic education and healthcare, respect for human rights, all contribute not only to individual wellbeing on the basis of equity, that's true, but much more to the economic progress of the society. And now we are waking up in recent years to the fact that that must include girls and women, on an equal basis. That's not only a matter of equity; again it's a matter of available economic investment for developing countries.

Pillar four is education for survival. A crucial and badly neglected part of education is direct instruction at all levels, and I do mean all levels, from young children to political leaders. And I've had some experience at every level. It's interesting about political leaders; we can come back to that later if you want--education and violence prevention, conflict resolution and mutual accommodation. Yes, as some of you here know, Stuart, Karen Egan [phonetic], others here, know that I pushed very hard on math/science technology education, and that's fine. The developing countries need much more of that than they've had. But we all need education in mutual accommodation, in learning to live together, and that in fact is a title of a book that Betty and I published a couple of years ago, "Learning to Live Together, Preventing Hatred and Violence in Child Adolescent Development." So, I'll leave you to read the book.

I do think, as we develop in there, the one key element is upgrading of the schools for this purpose. There are many specific promising lines of inquiry and innovation, about how the schools not only in content but in process, and in their social organization, can provide favorable conditions for inter-group contact; inter-group, between groups that have previously been suspicious or even hostile. And when it comes to learning about prevention with governmental leaders, we've had some experience during my Carnegie years with governmental leaders in the U.S., Europe and Africa. We've learned a lot, it was a very small scale, I think it was a valuable precedent. There are interesting examples. I think the U.N. could be on focal point for leadership in this. I'd like to see that happen.

Pillar five is the use of international justice to reduce human rights abuse and mass violence. There is a strong link between human rights abuses and the instigation of deadly conflict, war or genocide or both. Conversely, reliable

safeguards from human rights go a long way to prevent mass violence. One new element, well the basic element in this picture in my judgment is democracy. I know of no other way to protect human rights on a large scale except to build democratic institutions and sustain them. You can't go complaining forever about individual cases and making a fuss about abuse of individuals. That's important to do and I did a lot of that in the bad old days of the Soviet Union, but if you're talking about large scale protection of human rights, I know of nothing except established democracy to make that possible.

However, there is some augmentation, and one interesting augmentation now is the creation of international courts, created for Bosnia, for Rwanda, now the International Criminal Court, attempt of the international community to say, "We care very much about human rights, and we will try to do what we can to prevent perpetrators from getting away with murder," or at any rate getting away with massive human rights violations. In South Africa, and now all over the world, there is a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, with remarkable leadership, helped to heal rankling antagonisms by clarifying and respecting basic human rights and dignity.

So, the growth of human rights has been a surprise to the world. When Eleanor Roosevelt got through the 1948 U.N. agreement, I think the reaction of the world was, "She's a very nice lady and she means well, but nothing much will ever come of it." A lot came of it, it became a very powerful movement. Some argue the most powerful movement of the 20th Century. I don't know about the second half of the 20th Century. When President Ford went to Helsinki, even his own people were very skeptical about the, whatever it was, the final basket which was human rights. It turned out to be, in the first instance it was an anti-Soviet weapon, to stir up human rights things within the Soviet Union, and in Eastern Europe. It did that alright, but it turned out to be kind of contagious, and spread throughout much of the world.

So these, these supposedly hot air enterprises about the human rights rhetoric, turn out to be rather powerful because they fundamentally speak to the dignity of all human beings. They speak to something that is in all of us. You don't get it by virtue of your nationality, your religion, your ethnicity, you get it by virtue of being human, you're entitled to human rights.

Now, pillar six, and the last one, they didn't get to nine this time, is restraints on highly lethal weapons. There have been a lot of good ideas in this field over a long time, but very little action. It's a field in which I've personally been involved. And I just want to emphasize for you, in a way I probably should've said first, the immense danger of contemporary circumstances. For instance, we talk about "small arms" and "light weapons," those are collected euphemisms which include highly lethal machine guns, mortars, automatic rifles and rocket launchers. They kill millions every year, but they're not

classified as weapons of mass destruction. They cover the world wall-to-wall, but only modest efforts have been made to restrain them.

Indeed, developed nations, including our own contribute to the ubiquitous presence by selling them indiscriminately, and we've seen how China has done that in Darfur. At the extreme of lethality, biological, chemical and above all nuclear weapons, have almost unimaginable destructive power, and it's surprising how little has happened since the end of the Cold War with respect to the danger of nuclear weapons. There is one big successful effort I had the privilege of participating in its origins. The Nunn-Lugar Initiative for Cooperative Threat Reduction has been responsible for the dismantling of well over 5000 nuclear warheads and for removing all nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. And you can take a deep breath on that one, because those countries had lots of nuclear weapons, probably more than Britain and France, and Belarus is now under a - - type dictator, so that was a nice piece of work in the early post-Cold War years.

We have to put this program on a global basis. Senator Nunn gave a brilliant speech in Oslo last month, about the rationale and some of the mechanisms for making this a global movement. And a main reason is everybody has to be scared now. There's simply no country or no region that is exempt from the danger of nuclear weapons, especially in the hands of terrorists, but also in the hands of some states that believe that they're not deterrable. President Eisenhower was asked once about the Soviet leaders, and he said, "Well, they're unpleasant, but they're not early Christian martyrs," so they're deterrable. But we now have this sense of martyrdom and paradise and all that, in some places, and if that were to be, to move ahead in the next decade or two, then you could have instant genocide in some parts of the world.

But even we and the Soviets have not done very much. We have gotten, we and the Russians, I should say, we've gotten our weapons down considerably, but we still have many, many thousands. And what you probably don't realize is that most of them are still on hair-trigger alert. And the possibility of mistake and accidental, or an inadvertent launch, is greater now than it was during the Cold War when we had much more discipline about controlling our nuclear weapons. Even then we had some close shaves.

There is a recent revival, what I call a mafia, in which--I call it that, because I've been involved--of serious analytical efforts to work toward the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, examining thoroughly both technical and political obstacles, and intermediate steps toward overcoming them. That's crucial. No use having exhortation about it. We've had lots of exhortation, it hasn't led anywhere. You have to face up to how difficult it is. What are the technical obstacles? What are the political obstacles? And to analyze to the best of our knowledge how they might be overcome. I don't know if it's a feasible proposition, a lot of wise people think not, but I think we've got to try.

Incidentally, I think NGOs worldwide could make a major contribution on the weapons problems, many of the weapons problems, as they did on landmines, and so to the international scientific community, which made major problems during the, progress during the Cold War, but is doing less at the moment than I think we are capable of doing.

Alright, in the few remaining minutes, let me just say a word about who can do what, in building and maintaining these pillars that I've sketched, the United Nations, first and foremost. Kofi Annan strengthened the U.N. capacity to foster international cooperation in violence prevention. In many ways, from many kinds of violence, many concrete steps, it's actually one of the least understood and appreciated of his major contributions. He did so much in his low key, highly professional way, that people don't being to realize that he changed the culture of the U.N. with respect to prevention, and Ban Ki-Moon is doing everything in his power to keep that moving.

The genocide piece is one part of it. Kofi Annan created a unit, or a small experimental unit, on prevention of genocide. It was a huge precedent, it was the first time there'd ever been a high level prevention person appointed in the Office of the Secretary General, that was the first time there'd ever been a focus on prevention and genocide, two things at once. In a letter to me not long ago, he gave me a lot of credit for that happening, and I wrote back and said, "Well, I appreciate what you say, you spoke about my persistence. The real problem is to distinguish between persistence and harassment." [laughter] "And I'm afraid Bob Orr might testify that I've come pretty close to harassment a number of times."

But it did get done, and then it was passed to Ban Ki-Moon, and it would be very easy for Ban Ki-Moon to have done what many leaders do, we've seen in our country, very vividly, to say, "Ah, that was the last guy's initiative, that won't work, we don't want that." Far from it, he stuck his neck out and put a very high priority on doing this. He's enlarged it, he's strengthened it, he's appointed a full time rather than a part time director of the unit, a world class person, Francis Deng, who unfortunately is out of the country, or would have been here tonight. If he'd been here, I would've called on him, but I can't pass the buck to him tonight.

All I'm saying is that leadership really matters. All the wise guys about the U.N. inside and out of it said that Kofi Annan couldn't do it, and then they said Ban Ki-Moon wouldn't continue it, and neither of those is true. I don't know how far he'll go, but it is launched, and it is one hell of a precedent. Now the U.N. in general has handicaps with respect to prevention of mass violence. One is it's under funded and under staffed for prevention. Second is the security efforts are constrained by the threat of the Security Council veto. It's inherent in the nature of the Council, they are autocratic and dictatorial member states in the permanent five, and they are autocratic and

dictatorial states at any given time in the rotating ten, so it has not been a congenial place for prevention.

Kofi Annan worked one full year to get the first retreat in the history of the Security Council, 'cause he wanted it on prevention, after the Carnegie Commission came out. And eventually I had the privilege of coming down to Princeton for the first ever retreat, and we discussed prevention. And to his surprise and my surprise, they were really interested in it, and it was a first step in what would be a long process. I do not count on the Security Council for much help, and I've so advised Juan Mendez and more recently, Francis Deng. You do what you can but it's very difficult.

Unfortunately I have to say the same thing about the General Assembly. There's still a lot of autocrats and dictators in the General Assembly, and the people who come from those countries. Fewer than there used to be, but the General Assembly is very suspicious, and of course the American invasion of Iraq made them more suspicious because they were saying in advance, "That's the kind of thing that would happen, the wealthy would crush the poor, and the strong would crush the weak." That's what we meant by helping, by proactive help, keep out. And points of entry is one of the crucial, sensitive issues in proactive help.

Anyway, those famous organizations, the Security Council and General Assembly, are so far not terribly helpful. On the other hand, the U.N. has considerable resources and opportunities that make it a valuable part of any regime to prevent mass violence. It has a worldwide organizational network, composed largely of capable, dedicated professionals, and if I may say so, rather like Bob Orr. Many of its agencies make vital contributions. The World Health Organization, with which I was deeply involved for many years, UNICEF, the U.N. Development Program, the EA on Nuclear Matters, the World Bank, the U.N. High Commission for Refugees, U.N. High Commission for Human Rights. These are well-known and they do a lot of good, and they've been on their own moving in progressive, humane, constructive directions in the past five to ten years.

Support for preventive diplomacy started a long time ago by Dag Hammarskjöld, who gave his life in the process, has grown, especially in the last ten years, via the Secretary General, his Secretariat, and analytical units such as UNITAR, the Institute for Training and Research, the recently created Mediation Support Unit, and the Department of Political Affairs, has considerable promise. The Secretary General's diplomatic resources and moral authority enable him to bring disputed parties together in a constructive atmosphere. The U.N. can assemble the political and economic power of some member states, mainly the established democracies, to create a package of preventive action. It can make available, and this is very important, and it has been spreading, it can make available to any troubled country or region

the entire world's experience, knowledge and skills, pertinent to building durable mechanisms for conflict resolution and peaceful inter-group relations.

In other words, with this legitimacy, and now with a growing body of knowledge about prevention, U.N. representatives can come into a country, or they're there already in the case of UNDP and oftentimes UNICEF, they're there already. They can say, you know, "We're not telling you what to do, but here are some things that countries have done in similar situations," or what I like to call peer learning. You can learn from other countries that have had similar experiences, here's an array of options, think about it, it could help.

Final word about the European Union, I think it holds great promise for leadership. Just as I've had the privilege of sharing the advisory committee on preventing genocide for Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-Moon, so to I've had the privilege of chairing International Committee for European Union reporting to Javier Solana, who's another great person. And we have made a lot of progress. There's a crucial meeting next month, in which I think, well I don't want to predict, but we're getting close to closure. We were at closure in that system when the Swedes lost an election. You have to have a sponsoring country in our system for the first year or two. Sweden was that, was committed, they lost an election, the successor didn't want to do it--ABC, Anything But Clinton, anything but the previous regime--and so there has been a very interesting process of sounding out other governments in Europe that might take the initiative.

The European Union is quite fantastic. The transformation of Europe since the end of World War II and the Holocaust is just beyond imagination. And these are now 27 democracies, 27 cooperating democracies. We never had that in the history of the Earth. Just as an example, in itself, it's enormously valuable, and there's a powerful magnet effect to the established democracies, in pulling in others, offering them the help and guidance to meet democratic standards and free-market economies.

So, I think an E.U. Center for Prevention of Genocide is likely to happen, I don't know exactly when. Probably pretty soon, and I think it will be closely related to the unit headed by Francis Deng at the U.N. The synergy between the U.N. and the E.U. would be powerful, if that comes to pass. The U.N. has all this worldwide capacity, and whatever else you could say about the U.N., it has the powerful democratic model, and tons of money, arguably the largest economy in the world. Some people say we do, some people say China does; I think the best evidence is probably that the E.U. does. But anyway, they're rich, and they're quite prepared to put money into the African Union and to the U.N. They're active in many parts of the world. The E.U. is now a very international body and almost a global body. So I speak personally about E.U. plus. They don't, but I do, I think the E.U. plus is their very meaningful contact, and their willingness to help technically, financially, morally, with a variety of countries all over the world.

So, essentially what these two centers would do, I'll just mention one, not ten points, would create a critical mass of knowledge, skill and best practices, by assembling a permanent core of professional staff, drawn from scientists, scholars, diplomats, lawyers, political and military leaders, and specialists in the field of conflict resolution and violence prevention. So prevention would have an address. If you're interested in prevention and you're out in there in the field with UNDP, and you want to know something about prevention as you saw an emerging situation that was worrisome, you'd know where to go, where they would know something about it, and they would be sympathetically helpful.

These centers cannot do all the things, they can't build the pillars of prevention, but they can know what the pillars are and how to maintain them, and help many different units around the world, at different organizations, including NGOs, and I think the U.N. and you can reach out to many other organizations to be helpful. I mentioned the African Union, the Organization of American States, - - . You could have a network, a worldwide network of regional organizations, that would get help from these two centers.

Now, brief concluding comment: You may think this is utopian, it's certainly very ambitious, it's certainly long term, it's certainly comprehensive. I don't think it's utopian. Think for a moment about the remarkable improvements in the human condition that have occurred during my lifetime, young as I am. In my lifetime, it suggests that prevention of genocide is also within reach in the 21st Century. We have seen the end of colonialism and imperialism; unprecedented advances in health and reduction of poverty; the worldwide spread of human rights, including the success of the U.S. civil rights movement in the '60s; the end of fascist and communist totalitarianism; the end of the Cold War; the end of Apartheid and the emergence of democracy not only in South Africa, but to a large extent throughout much of the world.

All of these triumphs have limits and periodic setbacks, but they represent great advances. Even slavery has at last come to an end in most of the world, not quite all. So we see in the decline of all these evils, strong expressions of emerging human decency, but also a need for constant vigilance to mobilize human capacity for fully learning to live together in personal dignity and shared humanity. Thank you for your attention.

[applause]

MODERATOR: Thank you, maestro. Now we get to the democratic part. David talked a lot about democracy and its importance. This is where we have a democratic discussion. I would like to ask your permission to borrow a few minutes from the reception, so that we can have a bit of a back and forth with David. David, one thing that struck me just listening to you, if I might take the prerogative of the chair to ask you the first question-- I was very struck listening to your commandments [break in audio] how much of this we've

started to internalize as practitioners, without necessarily knowing where it came from, although many of us do know where it came from.

Just on, you mentioned Kenya, as you were going through the principles. For those of you that don't deal on a daily basis with these issues, it is striking how the number of things you mentioned that were applied in this case, that previously really were not part of our instinctive behavior, immediate reaction and bringing together the international voices in kind of a concert of international voices. If you remember the early days following the trigger of the election, there were many different international voices, but recognizing the need to bring together those voices immediately.

Secondly, having and deploying high profile mediators immediately, before they were even accepted, getting them into the country, getting them into the region, having experts, you mentioned experts, having experts on call, not just lists, but actually phone numbers with those lists, we got people into support Kofi Annan and the mediation effort immediately. You mentioned the importance of human rights. Many still don't know the role that a human rights mission that was deployed to Kenya, accepted by the government, took a while to negotiate its way in, but in fact we have evidence that the parties around the country, that violence levels dropped because they knew that there were human rights monitors in country, and mentions of ICC and other things that you mentioned meant that people might be held accountable.

You mentioned technology, the role of using, harnessing the text messaging system in Kenya, that was being used by those who would perpetuate mass violence. So many of the things that you mentioned actually were just practiced in recent months, and I think it is a testament to you that that has actually happened. My question to you is, we always focus, by nature, as outsiders, on the role of outsiders. Could you reflect for a minute on how we cultivate these same sensibilities on the insiders. Those who are experiencing these kind of political tensions, where things could go right or they could go wrong, how do we mobilize the internal crowd that would take these messages into practice? We're getting better, we're not there yet, but we're getting better on the international side. How do we do the same thing on the internal populations that are subject to these kind of pressures?

DR. HAMBURG: Well, I think that that is a very fundamental issue. One of the things that Kofi Annan did, very vividly, and of course his knowledge and his stature made it more credible, was to point out very quickly to the Kenyans the immense dangers on the path they were on, that if they kept that going much longer, they would probably have a civil war, in which hundreds of thousands, maybe millions would be killed. And if they, if one side clearly won, then they might follow that up with a genocide. I mean, he was unsparing, I've discussed this with him, so I think it's reasonably accurate, he was unsparing in pointing out to them what that they had to lose. On the other hand, he was very strong on the incentives, what they had to gain,

politically, economically, socially, psychologically, if they behaved, to each other, in a decent way.

And he mobilized a lot of help in a very short time, and that was very important. I mean even, he got Priscilla Hayner, an expert on constitutions, to come from the International Center for Transitional Justice, to start up a draft constitution, saying to them, "This is a kind of hope. It's an authentic basis for hope that you could have a constitution that offers you kinds of protections that the South Africans have gained from their excellent constitution." So that's, I think a fundamental piece of it, but there's much more, obviously.

MODERATOR: If I could invite people to just stand to ask your questions, we will - You will borrow one of the microphones to do so. We will get a microphone to you.

FEMALE VOICE: --experiencing some difficulties with the wireless.

MODERATOR: Okay, so we will, if you would raise your hands and I'll acknowledge you, if you could just rise and please let us know who you are.

DR. HAMBURG: There's Noel Lateef.

MODERATOR: And we will start [laughs] with Noel first.

MR. NOEL LATEEF: Well, David thank you very much for that magisterial overview of a very, very complex issue. I was just wondering if you could comment on the role of the media. Do you see the media being educated, co-opted, in a meaningful way, in the genocide prevention process?

DR. HAMBURG: Well, I'd love to see that happen, it's hard going. I guess my most positive experience personally ever with that was some years ago, at the time the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, when we finished our main report, although not the great body of subsequent reports, President Carter arranged for a meeting with the then head, Eason Jordon, the then head of CNN International, you had him speak here. And we made a proposal to him that CNN, instead of just covering the violence, which they're very proud of, they're very proud that they covered the violence and shocked President Clinton in this instance, or Mitterrand in that instance, or whoever it was, fine, I guess that's a useful function for political leaders in denial. But we said, "What about looking at hot spots, or even warm spots, where trouble is brewing, it's visible on the horizon, maybe a year or two or three, and where there are experts both within the country and outside, who can offer some assessments of what could be done to prevent this flaring into a giant conflagration?"

So they did a series of programs like that, and then when the internal workings of CNN, Eason Jordan moved to another position, to my knowledge CNN doesn't do that any more, and I don't know anybody who does. You're

absolutely right, it's an enormous source of public education, for better and for worse, all over the world. And I think that political leaders, scientific leaders, you know, anybody interested in the subject who knows something about it ought to try to get some constructive media engagement. But I think it is a very hard problem.

MS. HANNA ROSENFELD: Hannah Rosenfield, Carnegie Corporation. Well, David, you have covered, as usual, so many vast and important issues all around the goal of preventing mass violence and genocide, I wanted to ask you about the human capital dimension of this, in terms of how the Center, which I think is a really important embodiment of all that you have been talking about for so many years, and institutionalizing all the analytical tools that you have supported through, for so many decades. But where is the human capital that's going, in this labor intensive, highly analytical area, going to come from? And I wonder if you could talk about how to have a comparable or complimentary network of universities around the world? How one might get that off the ground, to back up the center? Or where else the human capital might come from to make this really, really fly, and be the kind of preventive set of institutions that they could be?

DR. HAMBURG: Well, my proposals for the Center include that it would stimulate education at all levels, stimulate specifically training for mediation, negotiation and so on, would stimulate research on violence prevention. Now, I say stimulate, I don't say support, because nobody expects either of these two centers to have those funds. But in the major democratic countries, and let's take the E.U., they all have various science councils, and this Center, together with people like Solana, could explain to them and lean on them, that they have some responsibility to support research in this field.

Now I have to confess, when I was on President Clinton's, for eight years, the Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology, I wrote quite a lengthy paper on this stuff, and recommended an increase in the NIH and NSF budget for this purpose. We got a little bit, a teeny little bit, in a good time, but much less than this country could afford or should have done, especially since our track record on preventing genocide was not very good in that period. So this is not an easy thing to do. I think it would go much better in Europe, probably in Japan, Canada, and may go better here in the future, I don't know. But I think the democratic countries can support research and education and specific training.

Now the interesting thing within the U.N., that would have been unthinkable, I attended a session last week, a small seminar type UNDP group, where they are training people in Central Asia, in mediation and negotiation. And they're, they just get a few well qualified people at first, and then, you know, the, you could imagine that over a period of a decade or two, that various parts of the U.N. which are now open to this, could train a cadre, let's say of midlevel mediators, not even talking about the highest level mediators,

midlevel mediators, comparable to community health workers in developing countries. So that at the community level, there be some capacity to catch a fire when it was very small and do something useful about it. I think that's not inconceivable, and is encouraging.

The U.N. has done this largely under the radar, you know. I think if we were taking the Security Council it might not pass, but nobody sees the necessity to.

MODERATOR: Under the radar is sometimes the most wise course. One more down here, and then I'll move around the room.

MR. JOEL ROGERS: I'm Joel Rogers, at - - related to what Noel Lateef was saying, it seems honestly genocide doesn't do very well when you shine a light on it, it has to be done in the dark. We did see that one, it was done out in the open, Srebrenica when they done in full view of cameras with Dutch troops, but that seemed to have spelled the end of that particular genocide, it was their last gasp, when it was made public. I'd say, isn't it possible first it would be nice technologically to provide people in third world countries eventually the means to defend themselves with the cell phones and cameras and so on, and so they can beam up all signs, at least to a satellite, to witness stuff in the future?

DR. HAMBURG: I'm going to reverse the usual pattern, which is that somebody asks a brief question and the speaker gives a long answer. I just say I agree with you. [laughter]

MODERATOR: And I'll allow us to get a few more in here. Please, in back there.

MALE VOICE: I thank you, sir. - -

FEMALE VOICE: Excuse me, if you could just wait.

MALE VOICE: Thank you for your comments today. The E.U. is looking to expand by including Turkey as a member state in the future. And this has created a powerful motivation for Ankara to reform, you know, in spite of a lot of resistance from conservative elements in its political establishment. In light of this, do you think that the E.U. should make recognizing the Armenian genocide a forma requirement for a session to the E.U.?

DR. HAMBURG: Yes, I do. And I've made that recommendation repeatedly to the leaders, major leaders of the E.U. Not all, but major leaders. I've even written out some rhetoric that I think could be used by the Turks if they want to find a way out of this, a face saving way out. It's not all that difficult. Nobody's asking them to do what the Germans would do, to face up to everything, and pay reparations and all that. It's a rather modest request that's being made, but they have to recognize that that happened, and it still is very sensitive. I was told by good friends, "Don't put something in the Armenian, about the Armenian genocide, in your book, because that will inflame the

Turks." And I have some pretty good Turkish friends. I deliberately put it in there. How could I not?

Somebody else advised me not to put in the Holocaust, saying, "Everybody knows about the Holocaust." You know, there's certain genocides you just cannot ignore. And the Armenian one, the Armenian people all over the world have had a pretty lousy deal on this. And they're not asking very much, by and large. They're asking some sort of decent recognition this happened, it happened a long time ago under terrible circumstances, but it was recognizable, a very important part. You know, you see even scholars, that the Armenian genocide was 1915 to 1917--nonsense. Nonsense. It began in the, there was a big massacre in 1894. One of the people to whom I dedicate this book, Arant Katchadurian [phonetic], lost his grandfather in the Sultan's massacre of 1894.

There was over and over and over again. So it's a very important lesson that it teaches us. But today, I don't think that membership in the E.U. is compatible with any country that just flat out denies that a genocide occurred. I might mention one other clever thing done last year that gives a little bit of hope. There was a purely academic seminar about genocide, I think it wasn't called genocide, whatever it was called, but it was to be on that genocide, in a Turkish University. And at the last minute, the government cancelled it. Now that was in a public university, let's say like Berkeley, so they had the bright idea, "Let's try it at a private university, let's shift it to Stanford, down the road." And they did it, and the conference went on perfectly well. Maybe that's the beginning of something hopeful.

MODERATOR: I learned at the U.N., you never use sports metaphors in an international context 'cause everyone thinks in terms of sports differently, but I like the fact that we're getting not softballs here, but getting some nice fast pitches, 'cause you can hit 'em harder. I'd like to move to this side of the room.

MR. JOHN BRATIMUS: John Bratimus, New York University, third congressional district of Indiana. I cannot resist in view of what was just said, observing David after your splendid talk, I'm going to Nicosia in a few weeks to deliver a lecture at the University of Cyprus. And the reason is that I was one of the leaders in Congress that imposed an arms embargo on Turkey in 1974 after the Turks invaded Cyprus equipped with weapons supplied by the United States, which is an illegal use of American arms, and in my view, not only is the matter of the recognition of the Armenian genocide essential to Turkish admission to the E.U., but so also is Turkish evacuation of Cyprus a member of the European Union. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time. [laughter]

DR. HAMBURG: And they say that-- John Bratimus is from South Bend, I'm from Evansville, Indiana, Lee Hamilton's from Evansville, Indiana, we have a

mafia, a Hoosier Mafia, who have a remarkable similarity in our outlook. And John Bratimus, was it 22 years in Congress? John Bratimus did an immense amount of good during his 22 years in Congress. If anybody asks you about some cynical expression about the Congress, tell them about John Bratimus.

MODERATOR: Just like it's great that if oil had to be dropped somewhere in the world, it's good it was dropped in Norway, it's also very good to see that public policy genes were dropped into Indiana, also. [laughter] Okay, anyone else over on this side, please down here in front.

FEMALE VOICE: Thank you. - - member. I think just to complete your ten commandments, and I guess - - , then actually as citizens, I think we have a responsibility, and maybe one of the ways that we can help is to actually have our politicians, especially in election time right now, to talk about what they will do to prevent, and to actually make them accountable if they don't really follow what they said or they will do. And then the ones that actually do, those countries, the democratic countries, that do not participate to prevent genocide, to have them accountable in way that having them giving some compensation to the victims, if they do not participate in the peace process.

DR. HAMBURG: Know that-- Thank you very much, I agree with that. On your media point, I think the, a very important function would be if you could do it, would be to get key media leaders interested in the prevention approach, whether it's genocide or it's not genocide, and a prevention approach. And gradually build a constituency for prevention in the country. That's what the political will thing is about. The political will is that the leader's afraid to do anything 'cause he thinks he has no backing. I've had this discussion with some of our leaders. "Nobody would support me if I did that." But if you knew there was a constituency for prevention, and there was some heat on his backside to do something sensible.

But, you see, the prevention approach is not understood, so they take that to mean they want you to go fight a war, and nobody wants to go fight a war. I don't take the Srebrenica example as a terribly good example. Yes, it worked, it worked, we got away with it, but it was a war. And it would've been much better sooner. The Vance Owen plan to which all three parties agree, and in general diplomatic approaches to that conflict were badly ignored, and partly because the leaders both in Europe and in America really didn't have a clue about preventive diplomacy, or conflict resolution, beyond the standard traditional diplomacy, which didn't apply to that situation.

MODERATOR: Because I know that there is a very nice reception organized for us, I just want to keep two more questions, and then David mentioned before how young he is, and he is proof positive in fact that youth is not a function of years, it's a question of attitude, so knowing his stamina, I know he will be willing to take some personal questions during the reception period. But why

don't we take two more here in plenary, and then we can break for the nice reception that the FPA and the Hungarian Consulate General have organized. So right here down the middle, please.

MR. ALBERT GOLDSTEIN: Hi, Albert Goldstein, for - - Association. We already were sort of aware of the problems brewing with the food shortages in quite a number of developing countries throughout the world, as well as the water shortage which of course contribute to the lack of producing food for the future. There's a possibility of having multiple serious problems in those countries with extreme violence, governments using that as a cover for their nefarious purposes. What resources do we have right now, what are we doing right now, developing countries and the United Nations and other organizations, to try to prevent the situation from spiraling out of control?

DR. HAMBURG: Well, there's quite a bit of activity in both the U.N. and E.U. to face up to the water shortage problem and to the food problem. The U.N. of course is better organized to do that, with the World Food Program and the Food and Agriculture Organization. They do offer tangible help, but it's, I agree with you, this looks like a worldwide crisis which can easily be used by tyrants and despots to inflame their publics, and create situations of violence in which they consolidate their power. And I, to put it just bluntly, I think that the rich countries are really going to have to get their act together very quickly because it's coming on more rapidly than anybody expected, just as climate change is coming on more rapidly than anybody expected, and will affect food supply and all that.

So, we really have to get our act together, the rich countries of the world, not just the West, and not just the U.S. By the way, this is not a talk on U.S. foreign policy. I don't know what the U.S. will do in the future. The U.S. will take years to recover from the hole it's in now, and the first principle is if you're in a hole, don't dig. But I hope the U.S. will participate, let's put it that way, constructively in these things. We have, we still have the greatest science and technology community in the world that can contribute a lot. But we with the Europeans, with the Japanese, with the Canadians, with the South Africans, with the Indians, with the Brazilians, the Argentineans, the Chileans, there are a lot of more or less established democracies, more or less well to do, who will need to cooperate.

Some of the countries I've mentioned, they say, "Well, we're not so well to do," well you are compared with the ones you're talking about, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. And we just have to, on a multi-lateral basis, get our act together. Maybe that could happen. I tried and failed to do that in 1986-87 about the former Yugoslavia, anticipating the war that happened, and struck out. Our leaders were pretty good about it. John Whitehead was one, and George Schultz, and they went to their European counterparts, who at that time were nothing like today's E.U., and they said, "Oh, you Americans are very excitable," or words to that effect. It's very hard to get the rich countries

to really see the urgency of the situation and not to indulge in wishful thinking. But do what you can to get them aware of the gravity of this problem.

MODERATOR: Provide one quick editorial comment on this, I've been spending quite a bit of time this week and in fact over the last two months on the food crisis issue. This is one, as David says in his book, is seldom a surprise. We've actually seen the food crisis come in before it was recognized as a crisis. It's very hard to mobilize governments around that, but I think right now, we are looking very actively, both at the sources of the crisis. Right now there's a crisis dynamic developing that is exacerbating the speculation and the kind of market panic is creating a bigger crisis. But we are going to have to face up squarely to the production issue.

And the world, we have not had a situation in recent decades where you could say we actually are short of food. It's always been a distribution issue. We can now say, "We are short of food." And this looks like a structural problem for quite some time to come. So we are going to have to mobilize, not just the immediate money to the immediate humanitarian needs, but we will have to face up to the questions of the so-called green revolution in Africa that Kofi Annan and others have talked about for quite some time. We have to start investing majorly in Africa, it's the one continent that is producing less food every year, not more food.

But even beyond Africa, we have to have a global focus on food production, and this is something that is going to take quite a serious discussion among lead-- at the leaders level. This is not a technical issue.

One more, please. Right there. Was your hand up? I think we're going to give you the last question. You're working for it, so--

FEMALE VOICE: [laughs] I'm curious, now with the U.N. and the E.U. and other institutions working towards a framework to deal with and prevent genocide, like you've mentioned, how does that impact the precedent of humanitarian intervention when it comes to international law?

DR. HAMBURG: Well, the, many of the countries in the world have been apprehensive about all that sort of thing. First it was humanitarian intervention, then the terminology changed to human security, and now the terminology has changed to responsibility to protect. And my friends in the General Assembly say "We recognize that stuff, you change the terminology but not the action, we see it as forceful intervention without our permission, and we don't like that."

Well, there are a lot of ways to get permission, there are a lot of ways to make clear the benefits, but insofar as, you know, Mr. Mugabe says, "Don't interfere." And Tabil Mbeki [phonetic] buckles to him and says, "Oh, we wouldn't interfere, Mr. Dictator, no we wouldn't." That's the model, that's the

model, humanitarian intervention, human security, responsibility to protect. I think we have to face up to the fact in the U.N. and E.U. and so on, that the euphemism won't get us very far. You can't slip it by these people, they're not stupid. They are apprehensive about being dominated by others, but I think most countries in the world don't have a particularly malevolent version of that. Most don't, Mugabe does.

MODERATOR: Thank you very much, David, and thank you all for--

[applause]

