August 21, 2008
Click here to read Reassertive Russia Part I
As ambiguity continues to surround the complete Russian withdrawal to pre-conflict lines in Georgia, implications from conflict are not yet fully clear. On the U.S. domestic front, presidential candidate Senator John McCain shrewdly exploited the issue by using firm rhetoric and seizing the political initiative from both Senator Barack Obama and President George W. Bush. He has certainly increased his political capital going into the convention season.
In practical terms, the threat to oust Russia from the G-8 will not fundamentally impact Russia diplomatically or economically. There are clearly advantages to being a member of the G-8, but Russia can live without membership in an informal organization that is outliving its purpose and does not reflect contemporary geopolitical and economic realities. Blocking Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization, on the other hand, can have greater, and more substantive, implications. It is a much more real threat.
Talk of sanctions against Russia are likely to backfire. Russian diplomatic support is still needed on various fronts, such as counterterrorism and a wide array of issues at the UN Security Council. Without Russian support, the Permanent 5 + Germany initiative to curtail Iranian nuclear activities will not yield the necessary diplomatic dividends. It has already been a great struggle in recent years. Complete withdrawal of Russian support will terminate the limited progress that has been achieved.
The European Union's options to punish Russia Russia are also limited, due largely to its dependence on energy supplies from Moscow. It appears that the divisions between Old and New Europe have manifested themselves again, with the Eastern European states and the UK taking a firmer line against Russia than the states of western Europe, despite the public displays of European unity. In addition, although many Western European states are giving public support to Georgian membership of NATO largely to maintain public and diplomatic solidarity with Georgia, , many will be expressing reservations in private.
Georgia would have been better off focusing on economic reform and membership of the European Union than invading a disputed territory. Making itself an example of economic success will provide greater long-term results. It could have, and may still one day, provide an incentive for its separatist regions Abkhazia and/or South Ossetia to retain a strong relationship with Georgia. In 1974, many Turkish Cypriots welcomed Turkey's military intervention. Over 30 years later, however, many Turkish Cypriots favor reunification with Greece due largely to the economic success it has enjoyed in its part of Cyprus, embodied by its membership to the European Union.
Energy Security
The issue of energy security was certainly impacted by the current crisis. Although the pipelines extending through Georgia from Azerbaijan to the Black Sea and Turkey have not been directly hit by the Russians and account for only 1 percent of daily global output, Vladimir Putin was sending a clear message that the security of regional pipelines whether passing through or outside Russia will remain subject to Russian influence in all aspects. It also constitutes a veiled threat to its neighbors that it is safest to use Russian routes for future pipelines. This could backfire in the long-term, as more Central Asian republics shift their supplies eastward toward China.
Conclusion
Mr. Bush's statement that Russian-style action in Georgia is unacceptable in the 21st century seems detached from reality. It is clear that such actions are diplomatically less acceptable and more controversial than in the past. However, regional powers will continue to employ the means they deem necessary to secure their interests. The Russian statement following the current action creates the impression that Russia is predisposed to using full force whenever it wants. The reality is that Russia will remain reluctant to use full force but wants to make it known that it will use limited force to get what it wants. That threat alone will be enough to guarantee the leverage it wants diplomatically, particularly against the ex-Soviet republics. Furthermore, despite Mr. McCain's claim that "we are all Georgians", within the long-term grand scope of global security challenges, Georgia may loom less large than Mr. Saakashvili realizes, or Western policy-makers would like to admit or willing to admit.
Concern over Russia's aggressive rhetoric towards some states of New Europe (that is, states of the former Warsaw pact) is simply that. The reality is that Russia considers these states a long-lost cause. Maintaining stable and pragmatic economic and commercial ties with the larger states of Western Europe remain its chief concern, particularly in light of massive foreign direct investment from Germany.
In addition, Russia obviously feels it has abundant diplomatic capital and economic reserves to take a firm hand in the region and will not pay a huge price in doing so. Among its many interests, a principal goal of Rusisan foreign policy is consolidating hegemony in its near abroad, that is, the inner geographic circle of the ex-Soviet republics.