August 14, 2008
Click here to read Reassertive Russia, Part II
As a fragile cease-fire between Russia and Georgia barely contains the worst crisis between Russia and the West since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western policymakers are struggling to determine the exact implications of the current conflict and whether this marks the beginning of a new Cold War.
To say that Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili overplayed his hand in the build-up to hostilities is clearly an understatement. To put it mildly, he naively underestimated and grossly miscalculated Russia's response and broader intentions. After years of mutual provocation and brinksmanship over the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Mr. Saakashvili unwittingly walked into Russia's trap.
Russia justifies its actions by employing the language of humanitarian intervention that the West used against Serbia's President Milosevic when intervening in Kosovo in 1999. The term "ethnic cleansing" has become the one of the most abused words in the lexicon of international diplomacy, with the rhetorical exchange between Georgian and Russian leaders being the latest example.
RUSSIA'S AGENDA
Mr. Saakashvili's offensive into South Ossetia provided the pretext for Russia to implement a long-held agenda and aspiration to (1) restore Russia's hegemony and role as the dominant regional power; (2) counter U.S. influence and broader Western interests in the region, principally NATO and arguably EU expansion; (3) provide a warning to ex-Soviet republics not to get too close to the West in any way that would contravene Russia's interests in what it deems its sphere of influence; (4) demonstrate a willingness to use force when it determines necessary; (5) destabilize Mr. Saakashvili's position internally through devastating force. With the exception of Ukraine, the other ex-Soviet republics generally remained silent or passively acquiescent.
Russian pride and prestige obviously suffered with the fall of the Soviet Union. The desire to reassert itself internationally has played a large role in Russian foreign policy, particularly after the economic turbulence of the 1990s and the humiliating experience in Chechnya.
The increase in the international price of energy, which has filled Russian coffers, has played a key role in Russia's resurgence, principally on the economic and diplomatic fronts. However, the desire to recover pride on the military front fueled Russian nationalism, particularly after the humiliating experience in Chechnya, which is currently under control but at a huge price. Mr. Saakashvili presented the Russians with the opportunity to fill the military gap.
SAAKASHVILI AND GEORGIA
In much of the Western media, the crisis has been portrayed as David against Goliath. Until now, Goliath seems to be outwitting David. The erratic behavior and rhetoric of the Georgian President risks making a bad situation even worse, as demonstrated by claims that the U.S. would be taking over Georgia's ports and airfields, a claim the U.S. immediately denied.
Saakashvili is proving to be a diplomatic hand-grenade. His perception of Georgia's power and the reality of its limitations are quite disproportionate. It was beyond na�ve of him to confront Russia with raw power. A simple glance into Russian history would provide an insight into how Moscow would react. A small state like Georgia should act more like Switzerland, not a regional power player. With the prospect of NATO membership so close, Mr. Saakashvili recklessly undermined his chances of joining the alliance and threw water on the ambitions of Ukraine, since many European members of NATO (principally Germany) will be reluctant to extend membership and risk further friction with Russia.
Ultimately, ordinary Georgians were more supportive of Mr. Saakashvili's ability to change Georgia for the better internally and less concerned with the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which had more to do with pride and ego than anything else. Territorial integrity is important, but internal stability and prosperity should take greater precedence.
FALLOUT OF CONFLICT
Although it may take time for the full extent of the conflict to unfold, some results may have already become apparent. For one, South Ossetia and Abkhazia will fundamentally remain under Russian control, de facto or legally, regardless of diplomatic negotiations. By taking the political initiative, Moscow's position is vastly reinforced. The conflict will embolden Russian foreign policy and nationalism. However, Russia must be cautious and not overplay its own hand diplomatically, particularly when warning the U.S. it has to make a choice between supporting its "special project" in Georgia and forging a real partnership with Moscow.
The potential for spillover of the conflict remains real as demonstrated by the warning of the Ukrainian president not to allow re-entry of Russians vessels stationed in Sevastopol if they are used in operations against Georgia. Finally, the conflict will seriously complicate NATO membership for both Georgia and Ukraine as formal discussions are to be held at the NATO gathering of December 2008.
U.S. RESPONSE
The limited U.S. response is due primarily to the reality of minimal leverage and genuine surprise at Georgia's actions and Russian reactions. Apart from humanitarian help and diplomatic support, there is little the U.S. can do from a hard security perspective, unless Russian troops eventually do not withdraw back to their original positions inside Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, once the situation simmers down, one must not exclude possibility of an increased U.S. military presence in Georgia, well beyond the current 100 technical advisers, and in other countries in the region. The missile defense proposal for Poland, for example, will certainly be addressed with a fresh perspective on both sides. Not becoming a NATO member does not necessarily mean not having a future U.S. military presence in Georgia.
Marco Vicenzino is director of the of the Global Strategy Project and served as deputy executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies - US in Washington. He is a graduate of Oxford University and Georgetown University Law Center and has taught International Law at the School of International Service of American University. He has provided commentary on BBC World, CNN International, CNN Spanish, Fox News and Al-Jazeera and is a regular guest speaker at conferences around the world. He can be contacted at msv@globalsp.org