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Part II: External Factors and Obstacles to Success

  • Source: Special Series: Examining Afghanistan
  • Author: Marco Vicenzino
Part II:  External Factors and Obstacles to Success

Read Part I: Internal Dynamics and Challenges

July 26, 2007

Long Term Threats to Success

The biggest long-term threat to "success" in Afghanistan remains the potential for an irreversible loss of legitimacy of the central government. From the very beginning, expectations of ordinary Afghans for the new government was high. It's failure to deliver in the non-military sphere, combined with the lack of a full international commitment, endemic corruption and pervasive inefficiency have taken an enormous toll on public support.

Although the international community can still improve its levels of engagement in most sectors, the best this can do is buy time for Afghanistan. Ultimately, the failure of the central government to deliver, or at least create the perception of delivering, will make the fundamental difference in determining Afghanistan's future.

The Afghan public also needs assurances that the commitment of the international community will be long-term, consistent and reliable. Memories of international neglect after the post-invasion Soviet withdrawal, along with the rise of the Taliban, remain fresh in the minds of many Afghans. How committed to Afghanistan is the international community? Although the level of support varies from one country to another, overall the signs have not been particularly encouraging, particularly for ordinary Afghans.

For one, obtaining additional funds and supplies from NATO states for Afghanistan has been comparable to pulling teeth. Fierce debates have taken place in the parliaments, media and courts of public opinion of many NATO states. In Italy, the government coalition nearly collapsed. In Germany, vocal calls for withdrawal ensued after German soldiers were killed by suicide bombers in Kunduz. Holland's parliament struggled over the decision of transferring soldiers to Afghanistan's conflict-ridden south. The recent deaths of Canadian soldiers sparked furor in the Canadian parliament and media. British military resources are over-extended by various engagements around the world.

Although all 37 nations involved in Afghanistan are providing some form of contribution, as a whole the efforts and resources are still inadequate for the mission. In addition, greater burden sharing is required on all fronts. US, British and Canadian troops continue to bear the brunt of heavy combat in the south and east of Afghanistan.

The threat of national parliaments of NATO member states failing to renew their mandates beyond the next few years remains real as public support in many NATO states continues to taper. Much has to do with the failure of political leaders to engage in direct dialogue with the public to explain the importance and magnitude of the mission. This failure, or perhaps more accurately lack of will, derives primarily from politicians' fear of retribution at the polls Although some states, such as Italy and Germany, have developed strong pacifist traditions after two bloody world-wars, this no longer provides an excuse for inaction, or limited action, in a post-9/11 globalized world of growing unconventional threats.

Afghanistan's Neighbors: Pakistan and Iran

Forces from beyond Afghanistan, particularly from bordering states, continue to complicate matters enormously. Few doubt that significant Taliban and Al Qaeda elements operate from Pakistani soil, particularly in the rough mountainous border region. The debate continues to revolve around the level of Pakistani government control of these areas, the extent of its efforts to combat the threat and whether any support, either actively or passively, is being provided by local tribes or government sources.

The U.S. may be overestimating Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's ability to deliver, particularly in light of competing interests and loyalties within Pakistan's security and intelligence establishments. On the other hand, Musharraf may be publicly under-selling his ability to deliver. He does just enough to secure the U.S. seal of approval as a "partner in the war on terror" and ensure his own survival, but not much beyond that which may risk further exacerbating relations with his religious opponents who view him as an American "stooge". "Doing more" will also require Musharraf to invest additional political capital and resources of which he is currently in limited supply. His recent removal of Pakistan's chief justice [since reinstated by Pakistan's Supreme Court], energized a growing civil opposition movement, and the bloody outcome of the Red Mosque both indicated growing challenges to his rule.

It appears likely that the more militant elements of Iran's security establishment provide a degree of support to the Taliban, but far less than for the insurgency in Iraq. Encircled by Americans on their borders, with Afghanistan to the east and Iraq to the west, Iranian officials choose to resist through third party pressure and proxy violence. The objective is not to allow for the return of the Taliban, Iran's sworn enemy, but to ensure they are sufficiently supplied to keep American and allied forces occupied, that is, to provide a good fight and bloody nose.

The U.S. Home-Front

As Iraq continues to dominate the U.S. political debate ahead of next year's presidential elections, Afghanistan continues to receive scant media attention for a number of reasons. When compared to Iraq, the U.S. casualty rate and taxpayer money spent are relatively low. The fact that Afghans are generally in favor of the foreign presence and more than willing to assume their responsibilities on the front lines makes the conflict far less controversial than Iraq. For those with no interest in foreign affairs the conflict in Afghanistan has become "yesterday's war". For those with limited interest it has become the "other war," one which generates the occasional campaign sound-bite to contrast with Iraq or sporadic headline covering a gruesome suicide bombing or Taliban attack.

American leaders from across the political spectrum have a responsibility to begin a wider debate with the American public over the conflict in Afghanistan. It requires an insightful and substantive discussion beyond mundane sound-bites and colorful rhetoric. Simply put, what is at stake will impact national security, international stability and future generations for the U.S. Many need reminding that 9/11 largely emanated from Afghanistan, and it is there that the challenges remain and continue to pose a regional and international threat.

Political leaders have an obligation to clarify an approximate time-line and magnitude of the operation. It must be emphasized that the struggle in Afghanistan, and other parts of the world, will require at least a generation of commitment and resources. A lack of support on the U.S. home-front will seriously discourage the Afghan public, which needs to be convinced by words and, above all, actions that long-term U.S. support exists and is sustainable.

The aim is to buy time in the short-term with the long-term objective of Afghans becoming self-sufficient and assuming control in all spheres, particularly with greater effectiveness in the security realm. After three decades of war, the task appears overwhelming, but success is far from impossible.

In order to sustain public support, U.S. political leaders must provide regular, and not sporadic, progress reports, particularly in the non-military sphere. People simply want to see results for their tax money. This becomes even more challenging due to systemic difficulties, principally the inadequate level of expertise in the non-military sector of the U.S. government and the short duration of experts' appointments to a specific location overseas.

Therefore, even if the funds for aid programs are available, there are often a lack of experts able to implement them efficiently, particularly in sectors such as agriculture, education, health and rule of law programs. Even if a qualified expert is found, his or her posting usually lasts no more than a year before a location rotation. This shortage of competence and lack of continuity has seriously hampered aid programs.

Greater technical training and lengthier stationing in hardship countries may ensure greater long-term development and growth and will better serve the national interest and the well-being of the intended beneficiaries.

On the US home-front, a strong disconnect has developed between the American public and the members of the armed services, particularly in the Army and Marines, who are operating on full combat mode. Many in the military view ordinary citizens as completely detached from their realities, including direct combat, extended tours of duty, strains on family life and ensuing consequences. After the high expectations created by the architects of the Iraq war, it is somewhat understandable that many ordinary Americans remain wary of overseas engagements particularly when such expectations are far from being realized. This is where responsible political leadership plays an essential role in (i) explaining the serious consequences of failure in Afghanistan, (ii) helping to restore credibility to the mission, and (iii) reassuring public support for the armed forces and Afghan public opinion of America's long-term intentions.

Furthermore, political leaders must emphasize that with a volatile Pakistan to Afghanistan's east and an increasingly assertive Iran to its west, the U.S. and its allies cannot afford to lose Afghanistan.

Conclusion

For the U.S., failure in Afghanistan will further damage its credibility and prestige as a global power and expose it to greater international threats. For NATO, failure in Afghanistan could mean the end of the most successful military alliance in history after its first ever deployment beyond its immediate perimeter. Furthermore, failure in Afghanistan would seriously undermine the transatlantic relationship and international stability since NATO remains a linchpin of global security.

For the Afghan people, failure would mean another tragic missed opportunity. Should failure prevail, history will record that their resilience and commitment to rebuild their nation after thirty years of conflict was not matched by the international community which over-promised and under-delivered.

Ultimately, failure in Afghanistan would mean a collective defeat for all with disturbingly unpredictable and irrational repercussions. This underscores the fundamental need for greater efficiency, complete engagement and a long-term commitment by the international community in Afghanistan, principally by the U.S. and its NATO allies. Anything short of this will have serious implications for regional stability and grave consequences for international order.

Marco Vicenzino, a foreign affairs analyst, serves as board member and strategic advisor to the Afghanistan World Foundation and he recently returned from a fact-finding mission to Afghanistan. He is director of the Global Strategy Project in Washington, DC, and John C. Whitehead Fellow of the Foreign Policy.

Associated with: NATO, US Role in the World, India and Pakistan, Western Europe, Research and Analysis Links

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