Read Part II: External Factors and Obstacles to Success
July 19, 2007
Although cautious optimism is often expressed about Afghanistan's long-term prospects, greater emphasis must be placed on caution and less on optimism for the foreseeable future.
The increasing number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan has been significantly undermining the level of support of ordinary Afghans for the international military presence and the central government. While this should not be interpreted as support for the return of the Taliban, is does reflect growing disenchantment and disillusion with the results of the central government and international community since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001.
Western leaders and NATO officials have expressed deep concern about the continuous loss of innocent civilian life, blame the Taliban for intentionally exposing non-combatants to hostile action and vow to improve coordination between coalition and Afghan security forces. However, military tactics and the status quo are unlikely to change dramatically any time soon.
If the purpose of the current Taliban summer campaign -- marked by increased attacks and suicide-bombings -- is to gain headlines internationally and domestically and create the perception of Taliban "success", the operations are yielding dividends. In reality, however, this apparent "success" has less to do with increased Taliban strength and more to do with the lack of a serious and unequivocal international commitment, as well as rampant inefficiency and endemic corruption in the political class. Over time, these shortcomings have become increasingly apparent.
Security and the Afghan Army
2006 proved to be an extraordinarily difficult year with a significant surge of violence, particularly in the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan. By early 2006, it was clear that the international military presence in these areas was not up to the task at hand, and by mid-2006 additional coalition forces arrived, primarily from the U.S., Britain and Canada. The Taliban deliberately focused its efforts on non-U.S. NATO forces, with the objective of eroding internal support and increasing opposition within many NATO states. This policy appears to be gradually yielding the intended results.
The growing Afghan army has slowly increased its effectiveness, but continues to struggle in direct confrontations with the Taliban. Although the recent killing of Commander Dadullah, a notorious and feared Taliban military leader, was carried out by Afghan troops, greater NATO training and support is still needed. Widespread incompetence and corruption continue to plague the police forces, particularly at the district levels and principally in the south, where local administrators are often engaged in the drug trade. The southern province of Helmand alone is responsible for the majority of poppy growth in Afghanistan, which as a nation accounts for over 90 percent of global opium supply.
The drug trade has grown exponentially since the 2001 U.S.-led invasion, principally in areas controlled by the Taliban. For a nation predominantly dependent upon agriculture, the promised alternative sources of agriculture have not been delivered, leaving farmers at the mercy of local warlords who are more than willing subsidize their poppy cultivation, often by force and coercion. At the same time, drug demand from developed countries, predominantly in the West, relentlessly continues to fuel the supply side.
Furthermore, the continuously deteriorating security situation makes these areas practically inaccessible to international development assistance, particularly for investment in infrastructure. Despite the recent announcement of an increase in U.S. aid ($4 billion for security forces, $1 billion for infrastructure), U.S. spending for Afghanistan remains extremely marginal when compared to Iraq. The health sector, which most directly impacts ordinary Afghans, remains the most critically under-funded and neglected area. In order to win "hearts and minds", it is also essential to feed and nurture the body. The life expectancy of an ordinary Afghan is 46 years of age, and even less for women. The maternal mortality rate is among the world's highest, since many Afghan women give birth without qualified medical assistance. Despite multiple appeals, Afghanistan's Minister of Public Health is still unable to acquire two basic helicopters for rescue and relief efforts. The helicopters would secure the transportation of medical supplies and critical patients to and from remote rural provinces in mountainous areas inaccessible by car or plane, particularly during the harsh winter months in places such as Pamira, Afghanistan's extreme northeast region. Hundreds of lives are lost annually, mostly from easily curable ailments.
Understanding the Tribal Structure
The mounting loss of innocent civilians continues to underscore the fundamental need for improved communication between international forces and Afghan security personnel. Having a more noticeable Afghan presence on the front lines and a less visible international footprint may reduce tensions and hostilities, particularly in rural areas where foreigners are often resented, and ignorance of basic cultural sensitivities can transform an ordinary misunderstanding into tragic violence.
Furthermore, the general tendency to assume a simplistic "black/white" approach and brand any opposition to the government as terrorist, Taliban, Al Qaeda, subversive or sympathizer has further complicated matters, particularly for foreign troops in rural areas struggling to grasp the intricate nuances of local culture.
This highlights the necessity for enhanced "network analysis," that is, better understanding of the grassroots network of tribes and clans that dominate the daily lives of ordinary Afghans, particularly in the rural regions, and most importantly in the war-torn areas of the south and east of Afghanistan. Increased knowledge of the intricacies and internal dynamics of tribal structures and the effective implementation of complementary tactics and policies will vastly contribute to the mission. Intelligently assessing citizens' needs, requirements and grievances and skillfully addressing them will significantly alter realities and perceptions of the intended beneficiaries, that is, ordinary Afghans.
The Political Landscape
In principle, Afghans remain proud of having achieved a form of representative government that is still a work in progress. It would be naïve to expect political change to occur overnight, that is, to undo what thirty years of violent conflict created. It is even more naïve to expect political change to produce a replica of a Western-style democracy. Change may only occur gradually within the complicated historical context, and real paradox, of a society still deeply rooted in its traditions yet uprooted, transformed and significantly displaced by years of turmoil triggered by internal and external forces.
The society's ability to move forward despite the enormous obstacles and challenges is a testament to the resilience and pride of ordinary Afghans, who value individual initiative more than dependence on international aid, and relentlessly struggle to create a better future for the next generation.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai -- liked by many as a well-intended leader but seen as increasingly ineffective -- is simultaneously caught between pressure from foreign powers and competing demands from domestic constituents, including the divergent factions in parliament and powerful leaders in the provinces. Briefly summarized, he means well but cannot do much. Recent events involving the loss of innocent civilians has further reinforced this sentiment among many and eroded support for the president.
In fragile states, it is not only advantageous for a leader to exude a sense of fairness but possess a certain aura of invincibility, omniscience and omnipresence, which can greatly contribute to national unity and purpose revolving around the strength of character of a single individual. In theory, Afghanistan requires an Ataturk-style leader, one who, like the father of modern Turkey, is able to create national unity and pursue democratic transformation in the midst of turbulent historic circumstances. In reality, however, rampant sectarianism and widespread factionalism complicates the task for any leader and significantly reduce the chances of any such national savior from emerging. No Ataturk figure appears on the horizon in Afghanistan, nor should one be expected anytime soon.
President Karzai is trying to maneuver as effectively as possible within increasingly narrow political limits and physical security constraints. Karzai is often referred to as the �Mayor of Kabul� since he rarely travels to the provinces due to risk of assassination. Even within Kabul, his security situation is tenuous. The inability to travel to the provinces due to security concerns further impacts his credibility with ordinary Afghans. With a more effective fighting force he could possibly do more, but to what extent remains subject to debate.
In essence, Karzai plays the role of chief intermediary and overseer of the different competing factions and groups. Any potential successor, regardless of strength of character or rhetoric, may be fundamentally confined by similar constraints.
Afghanistan's current political party system is still in flux and is unlikely to achieve full consolidation for the foreseeable future. Shifting coalitions and ad-hoc alliances of convenience will continue dominating the political landscape. The recent creation of a new political party composed of an ideologically incoherent cross-section of former enemies and allies may further complicate Karzai's task. It may also offer him the opportunity to gain political capital if he can skillfully exploit their differences through a divide and rule approach. The unfortunate reality, though, is that Karzai will ultimately be forced to simply muddle through the remainder of his term as president.
The reality of Afghanistan's current system of patronage will persist in Parliament, and particularly at the local levels. It is a system based on "cutting deals" and "give-and-take". Generally, it would appear no different from practices throughout the world, but what many in the west consider corruption, others in Afghanistan may view as standard operating procedure. It will require significant time for western standards of transparency and accountability to become part of the fabric of Afghan society, and particularly developing the institutions of civil society. One must accept the possibility that it might not occur, or not to the extent accepted in the west. International aid donors should bear in mind these realities, and demonstrate a degree of flexibility with the objective of reaching realistically achievable standards at a given point in time, while making constant efforts for long-term improvement.
Marco Vicenzino, a foreign affairs analyst, serves as board member and strategic advisor to the Afghanistan World Foundation and he recently returned from a fact-finding mission to Afghanistan. He is director of the Global Strategy Project in Washington, DC, and John C. Whitehead Fellow of the Foreign Policy Association.