Although the culmination of this election year will not arrive until November, political battles are already being won and lost. In Connecticut, challenger Ned Lamont defeated incumbent Joseph Lieberman in the Democratic primary for U.S. Senate. Many suspect that Lieberman's steadfast support for President Bush's Iraq policy was responsible for his defeat, and it is certainly true that the persistent violence and instability in that country has fed domestic discontent with the war for some time. But Lamont's primary victory suggests that such discontent has moved beyond the editorial pages; it may have reached a critical mass where it could actually affect electoral politics. If that discontent really does reshape Congress in November, however, the legislature may not be able to do much to affect U.S. policy in Iraq.
The Constitution explicitly gives Congress the power to declare wars and to raise and support the armed forces. It also makes the president the “commander in chief” of those same armed forces. This tension between the executive and the legislative branches over the country's war making powers is long and storied. Through much of U.S. history, a very rough rule applied: major military conflicts between the United States and another state were marked by a war declaration from Congress, while smaller military engagements could be managed by the executive without a formal war declaration. There have been only five declared wars in U.S. history. The number of overseas U.S. military engagements, however, far exceeds that number.
In the past 60 years, formal war declarations by Congress have fallen out of favor as the speed of international politics and military strategy have advanced. The Vietnam War represented for many a prime example of how the war powers had shifted too far in favor of the executive. In response, Congress adopted the War Powers Resolution in 1973. Passed over President Nixon's veto, the Resolution mandated that the president consult with Congress prior to the start of any military action and formally notify Congress that such action has commenced within 48 hours of it having done so. If Congress does not declare war or otherwise authorize the use of force within 60 days, the President would be obligated to remove U.S. forces from the hostilities.
On the surface, the Resolution seems to give great leeway to the executive to engage in military actions. But by formally codifying what previously had been an informal custom, the Resolution actually serves to constrain the executive. Accordingly, each president since Nixon has challenged the Resolution's constitutionality, although the courts have never ruled definitively on the matter. Yet despite this habitual opposition from the executive, each president has abided by the Resolution's requirements in every major military engagement since the 1970s.
The 2003 invasion of Iraq was no exception. In October 2002, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (AUMF), which granted President Bush the authority to use military force to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.” It cited a laundry list of offenses as part of this “continuing threat,” including Iraq's efforts to thwart UN weapons inspectors, its repression of its citizens, and its supposed links to terrorists associated with the 9/11 attacks. The AUMF also specifically declared that its passage fulfilled the authorization requirements of the War Powers Resolution. Such authorization from Congress was more valuable to the administration than any similar statement from the United Nations, and so with its passage, its most significant hurdle to military action against Iraq had been cleared.
As subsequent events have proven, however, the assumptions made in the October 2002 AUMF were flawed. Iraq was not in possession of any weapons of mass destruction, and its links to al Qaeda under Saddam Hussein were circumstantial at best. Accordingly, U.S. forces in Iraq have found their mission evolve as their occupation continues. First their mission was to depose Saddam Hussein; then it was to prepare for a return to power by Iraqi exile groups; then it was to rebuild the country and establish democratic institutions; then it was to suppress various indigenous and foreign-led insurgencies. In recent months, many have suggested that U.S. forces in Iraq are now attempting to ward off a Sunni-Shia civil war. A close reading of the original AUMF will find scant mention of any such mission.
This, at least, is the sense of some members of Congress. A recent hearing by the Senate Armed Services Committee elicited some revealing responses from members of the military leadership. General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that the recent violence in Iraq could possibly “[devolve] to a civil war.” When asked by Senator John McCain (R-AZ) whether he anticipated this situation one year ago, Pace paused for several seconds before somberly replying “no, sir.” In response to this gloomy assessment by Pace and concurring testimony from General John Abizaid and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Senator John Warner (R-VA) suggested a new course of action by Congress: “I think we have to examine very carefully what Congress authorized the president to do in the context of the situation if we are faced with an all-out civil war. And whether [we] have to come back to Congress to get further indication of support.”
Although this is a remarkable suggestion, there are any number of reasons why a new authorization measure will not be debated in Congress. It would give the president's political opponents an ideal stage upon which to attack his Iraq policy; one can be certain that he accordingly will use his influence to prevent any resolution from being introduced. Any public debate on the mission of U.S. military forces could easily be construed as “not supporting the troops” and have damaging political effects on whomever that accusation were leveled. And politics aside, the executive—including the military leadership at the Pentagon—is the “commander in chief” of the armed forces. If Congress passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, the president would be on firm political ground to interpret that request loosely, based on the demands of military expedience as well as on the “facts on the ground.”
Even if popular discontent with the president's Iraq policy results in a major electoral shift in November, Congress' ability to force a change in that policy may be limited. It could apply its “power of the purse” and threaten to withhold funding to support operations in Iraq. But senators and congressmen have tried this tactic before, to little effect. And so far, both Congress and the president have abided by the requirements of the War Powers Resolution.
The most likely effect of an electoral shift on Iraq policy would be one of perception. If Democrats secure a majority in one or both houses of Congress, they will gain leadership of congressional committees and the subpoena power comes with it. They could hold hearings and conduct investigations that would draw even greater attention to the pitfalls of current Iraq policy. That, in turn, could further focus public opinion, which ultimately is the most important determinant for any kind of policy adjustment. The legislature can focus and reflect public opinion, but only the executive can truly change military policy. And for that, the country may have to wait two more years.
Daniel Widome is a San Francisco-based writer and foreign policy analyst. He can be reached at Daniel.Widome@gmail.com