When I visited Lebanon in late February 2005, immediately following the assassination of Rafik Hariri, I found an air of defiance.  Simply tired of the status quo, people demanded change and the departure of Syria's presence, which occurred in the spring of 2005 and was followed by parliamentary elections. 

Returning to Lebanon in May 2006, I found an air of disillusionment with the status quo marked by complaints that "nothing will change" and "the same old faces are still running the show".  The perception of political paralysis was prevailing.  Despite such frustration, Lebanese were determined to create a new future and break with their turbulent past.   Lebanese factions from across the political spectrum engaged in a national dialogue and struggled to reach agreement on the most basic points.  Although often contentious and slow, it was important that Lebanese were trying to resolve their differences through dialogue and not the barrel of a gun.  Patience and the spirit of dialogue, once rare commodities, were becoming the order of the day.    There would be no repeat of the 1975-90 civil war, which claimed thousands, and another 15 years of Syrian occupation. 

However, the events of July 12th shattered this sense of hope.  The current violence is once again changing the face of Lebanon.  The US appears to be providing Israel with an unknown timeframe in its attempt to eliminate Hizbullah.

Did Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah miscalculate in the 12th raid?  To think that the Hizbullah leader would not expect such an Israeli reaction would be to underestimate his intelligence, particularly after witnessing the Israeli reaction to a similar Palestinian attack involving the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier.   Whether his actions prove politically fruitful for his organization in the long-term remains to be seen.  However, one fact that remains clear is that a nation lies in ruins, once again caught in the crossfire of competing regional interests.   

The attacks represent a massive psychological blow to the Lebanese national consciousness, where the scars and ghosts of the civil war still linger.  After nearly 16 years since the end of the 1975-90 civil war, Lebanon is still coming to terms with the violence and bloodshed, which claimed over 200,000 lives.

For Israelis, a new era has opened with its own cities being bombed and suffering loss of life.   The Iraqi Scuds that landed on Israel in the early 90's came from afar at a time when a massive international alliance of nations stood against Iraq.  This time, the more sophisticated rockets came just from miles of its northern borders.   The rules of the game are changing in more ways than Israel may have imagined before launching its attacks. 

The current attacks have devastated Lebanon's civilian infrastructure, primarily maritime ports, bridges, highways and other indispensable resources for the nation's economic survival.   Although the complete damage is yet to be fully assessed, it is very possible that, when and if hostilities cease there may be just as much, if not more, damage to the civilian infrastructure than the 15 years of civil war.   The final extent of damage may be so enormous that the idea that international aid will restore the infrastructure is misleading.  What donors often pledge and what transpires is usually quite disproportionate and fractional at best.   The reality is that Lebanon will be forced to assume more future loans to bear the brunt of the costs.   Their current debt stands at approximately $40 billion (for a population of 3 million) much of it assumed during the post-civil war reconstruction process from 1990 to the present.

Lebanon's economic challenges are insurmountable in the short-term, making it more dependent on others for aid and further increasing its status as a supplicant state.   Assistance will have to go beyond ordinary aid and debt rescheduling and must include greater trade preferences and incentives by developed states, such as free market access of Lebanese products and services, and a certain degree of debt cancellation from developed countries.   Although assistance and investment by Lebanon's vast diaspora is no substitute for international aid, it can make a difference, particularly at the local levels and in smaller communities with less access to international aid.

This summer was expected to be Lebanon's best tourist season with estimates of $2-3 billion in revenue.   It took several years for Lebanon to begin re-acquiring an appealing pre-1975 image for foreign tourists which has been shattered by the current attacks.  The post-1975 image of instability and conflict will return for the foreseeable future.   Restoring and re-branding Lebanon as a safe destination for travel and investment will require considerable time and deprive Lebanon of desperately needed cash inflow.   In addition, foreign investment will not be arriving anytime soon.

The slow process of political reform which was sparked by Hariri's death and genuinely began after the Syrian withdrawal and the parliamentary elections of June 2005 will not technically end but may face a potential state of suspended animation as confusion and uncertainty of the security situation will dictate the pace of the political process.

Although the current level of conflict may eventually de-escalate, the ensuing status quo may consist of a continued and consistent level of violence marked by guerrilla strikes, targeted assassinations, regular border skirmishes and artillery exchanges, and sporadic but heavy air strikes.

In the short-term, the strikes may debilitate, neutralize or even disable Hizbullah for a fixed period of time.   However, in the long-term, the devastation created by the attacks as marked by the destruction of Lebanon's civilian infrastructure, an impending humanitarian crisis, the displacement of thousands, and the loss of innocent life, will weaken and possibly lead to the collapse of a pro-Western democratic central government, cause a return of greater Syrian and increased Iranian influence, re-ignite sectarian divisions and animosities that could provoke a new civil war.   Such an unstable environment fuels greater radicalization, which breeds terrorism and risks creating an entire new generation of extremists.  Hizbullah was born out of the chaos of the Lebanese civil war and the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon.  Perhaps the past may provide a few lessons for the future.  

Following my visit to Lebanon in February 2005, I wrote that:

"Providing a new mandate for the existing UN force in South Lebanon(UNIFIL) and expanding its presence to the rest of the country to reflect current realities must be seriously considered, particularly a significant increase in troops.  UNIFIL was established by Security Council Resolution 425 in 1978 to confirm Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, restore the international peace and security and help the Lebanese government restore its effective authority in the area. In theory, the Lebanese government should take charge in southern Lebanon. However, this is not possible without international support…"

In light of recent events, perhaps it's about time. 

 

Marco Vicenzino is the founder and Executive Director of the Global Strategy Project. He served as Deputy Executive Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies-US (IISS-US) in Washington, DC, and is an international attorney. He is a graduate of Oxford University and Georgetown University Law Center and has taught International Law at the School of International Service of American University. He can be contacted at msv@globalsp.org