Mackinder's Heartland theory was a classical combination of these: The stability of geography in long run, and the conditions it produced as the theater of military actions (1). In 1918 and in the context of the emerging and menacing power of Germany, Mackinder introduced the buffer state strategy to be applied in Eastern Europe as a solution for the threat of the Heartland power. By the next year, Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon gave the chance to Mackinder to propose officially a splitting up of Russia. Great Britain would support the independence of Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Dagestan, the latter including Chechnya and Ingushetia. Most importantly, he suggested that Southern Russia, governed by the White troops, would be recognized as a separate state to that of Bolshevik Russia. He demanded unyielding position in relation to the Bolsheviks, foreseeing Britain's geopolitical interest in guaranteeing and controlling the railroad connecting Batumi to Baku. The route was almost identical to the presently near completion Baku – Ceyhan pipeline!
However, Lloyd George's government supported the ‘One Russia Policy', obliging Mackinder conclude that Russia faces an increased probability of becoming a great might of the Heartland, soon threatening Europe through the rise of a totalitarian and militaristic dictator (2).
Coming now to nowadays Russian politics, Zbigniew Brzezinski classifies the Russian post-Cold War schools of geopolitical thought into the a. Zapadnik (pro-Western) approach, b. the Slavophile, nationalistic, imperialist approach, and c. the Eurasianist approach, a counter alliance, involving some sort of Eurasian anti-American coalition designed to reduce the United States of America preponderance in Eurasia (3). The West always supported the Zapadnik approach, but Vladimir Maksimenko, member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and senior researcher of the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, criticizes the Brzezinski's geostrategic construction called ‘the Eurasian Balkans', covering the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia, as well those areas within the present Russian Federation which used to belong to the Crimean and Astrakhan Khanates, for imperialist plot targeting the areas that used to be Russian imperial dominions during the late czarist and Cold War periods. He suggests that Russians have a ‘legitimate' interest there and are subject to desired reconquest (4). No doubt this position testifies a Russian imperial mission and an Eurasianist ideology renaissance.
In fact, Eurasianism's early 20th century concepts –advocating the cultural and political struggle between the West and a distinct Russia – led ‘Eurasian' subcontinent- , championed by prominent figures as Nikolay Trubetskoi and later Lev Gumilev, are given much attention by the recent years reversion to the ‘new right' balance of power politics in Russia. The growing emphasis on geopolitics from all corners of the political spectrum, elevates Eurasianism to the level of a mainstream ideology. Hence, when Russian geopolitics is concerned of the ‘expansion of N.A.T.O.', the ‘Islamic threat' and ‘Russian security', they speak about the future rebirth of an again Greater Russia, poised as the ‘Russian idea' by those indorsing the Eurasianist approach in the Russian foreign policy praxis. Brzezinski calls for a U.S. strategy aimed at ‘the consolidation of geopolitical pluralism within the former Soviet Union', which the Eurasianist consider –merely rightly- a threat to the Russian Federation, counter-stressing the need for the construction of a multipolar paradigm to be applied in world affairs. To them ‘the Euro-Atlantic alliance's aim in Eurasia' equals to ‘the total geopolitical control over the world's largest continental space, rather than testifying an ideological or humanitarian goal (to be achieved)' (5).
In foreign policy practice, these views were mirrored more or less by the President Vladimir Putin's search for ideological basis for the direction of rising Russian imperialism (Autumn 2000) and analytically expressed through the thoughts of the well-known Russian nationalist and dissident, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. As some analysts suggest, Putin is clearly attracted to the Russian ultra-nationalist and geopolitician Aleksandr Dugin's visions for an empire of all Eurasia, dominated by Russia, advocated by his ‘Eurasianist Movement' (6). Dugin has expressed his opinions through his speeches and writing in which he presents himself as a passionate agitator of crusader mentality against ‘Islamic threat'. Dugin's leading work, ‘Osnovi Gepopolitiki: Geopolitichiskoye Budushiye Rossiyi' (The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia), serves as the cornerstone of the new Eurasianism. He adopts a revised balance - of - power politics and concepts such as the ‘Land' versus ‘sea' powers, based on strategic traditional theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Halford Mackinder, the need for the creation of a Russia – dominated Eurasian space, and the alliances building mechanism (Moscow – Teheran axis, Moscow – Berlin pivot and Moscow – Tokyo axis), in order to accomplish an ambitious innovation of ‘Derzhavnost', the idea of Russia as a Great Power, so popular now among Russians who barely stand their country's diminished international status.
Dugin has expressed him-self against the Baltic countries, Poland, Turkey and other frontier nations around Russia, and is believed to be constructing the new applicant ideology for ‘Russian mission' in the post-Soviet Empire's era. A mission embodied in Eurasianism, described as a ‘suitable answer against the supporters of Satanic Wahhabism who have penetrated Russia'(7). In this mission Russia is about to have its entire people united against Wahhabism, Christians and Muslims together, for the pro-Moscow official Islam in the Russian Federation supports the War on Terrorism launched by President Putin against the Chechen rebels. But a closer look at the brand of Islam practiced in the Southern Russian provinces and Republics, shows that for example Chechens follow the moderate Sufi traditions of Islam which are totally against the puritan Sunnite school of Wahhabism, sponsored by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and exported in Northern Caucasus and Central Asia along with huge amount of money destined to attract to deprived, impoverished mainly young in age masses.
The main direction of Russian imperial aspirations in the post-Soviet international system, is the traditional southern front or what Winston Churchill described as the “soft underbelly of Russia”. Nowadays geopolitical thought in Russia connects the ideas of Western conspiracy to anti – Islamic rhetoric, in which the West, Turkey and Israel are plotting an ‘Islamic conspiracy' targeting Russia's security. The identity and value – related vacuum in the post-Soviet era, combined with the fact that Russia has not been evolved into a nation – state and the Russian Federation sizable Muslim minority (North Caucasus, Volga – Ural region, Tatarstan, Bashkortistan, Omsk, Tyumen, Tobolsk, Novosibirsk, Vladivastok, Khabarovsk and Urengoi) –that has a different national and cultural sense of identity-, endows Russia with some characteristics of an empire. It thus influences Russia's world view, security perspective, and foreign policy choices with the outside world.
In Putin's scheme of thinking, Islam, particularly its extremist version, and the Muslim world are either major sources of threat to Russia or actual or potential competitors. Long before the events of September 11, 2001, President Putin had been warning of an arc of instability, extending from the Philippines to Kosovo (8) and claiming that an Islamic terror network, led by Osama bin Laden, was “trying to create an Islamic Caliphate, the United States of Islam, in which a wide range of Islamic governments would join as well some from the Central Asian states and parts of the present day territory of the Russian Federation…' (9). In fact the threat of Islamic extremism has brought Russia and the West closer together, but it has also meant the end of the old Soviet idea of using Islam, in whatever form –even its most radical one-, as an instrument of Russian foreign policy in the competition for economic and political advantage.
In fact, the Islamic factor has greatly impacted on Russia's foreign policy and strategic security concept:
a. The Kremlin has used the real or imagined threat of Islamic extremism to regain and consolidate its influence in the former Soviet Union, while limiting the expansion of Western influence, as well as that of regional countries. This was the case in Central Asia prior to the events of September 11, 2001. Russia has exaggerated the magnitude of the Islamic threat to justify its interventionist policy (10). The fall of Kabul, Afghanistan, to Taliban forces(1996), and in the aftermath the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (S.C.O.) which had the fight against forces of separatism and religious extremism as its main goal, all were used by Russia and China to achieve a convergence between separatist movements (Chechen and Uighur) to what both sides termed religious extremism.
b. In the South Caucasus, it was the two Chechen wars (1994 – 1996 and 1999 – present) that introduced the Islamic factor into Russia's relations with the Transcaucasian states, but here relevant only to the extend that the Chechen conflict could be explained in religious rather than ethnic and historical terms and as a manifestation of the Chechen drive for self-determination. The same in relation to Russia's relations with the Arab states and other Muslim countries, including secular Turkey, despite a significant amount of assistance provided by various North Caucasian and Turkish groups based in Turkey to the Chechens, Russia has not allowed the Chechen problem irremediably to damage relations with Turkey.
By contrast, with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan relations were much worried because of rivalry over oil and Afghanistan. Again in the case of Iran, because Teheran refrained from supporting the Chechens and tried to defuse tension between Moscow and Muslim capitals, the Chechen issue acted as an impetus for better Russian – Iranian relations.
In this international environment, the neo-Imperialism hidden beside the alliances and strategic -military or economic- projects through witch President Putin –echoing the hallmark concepts of his foreign policy predecessor, Yevgeny Primakov- aspires to bind the former Soviet Caucasus and Central Asia states to the so called ‘Russian mission'. This of course, even though not acknowledged, in fact serves the goals of the Eurasianist movement. Central Asia's ‘Rapid Reaction Force', Eurasian Economic Community and Shanghai Cooperation Organization, back the same purpose in Russian terms. That is to raise Russia into Eurasian hegemony for a renewed quest for national greatness and to unite the different religions of Eurasia against the ‘Great Satan', the United States of America. The Eurasianist positions of Aleksandr Dugin, do not necessarily coincide with President Putin's policies inside and outside the Russian Federation, but in a recent editorial, President Putin himself affirmed that “Russia has always seen itself as a Euro-Asiatic nation” (11). Definitely, September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to the U.S. and Islamic extremism has served Russian interests mostly in a negative fashion by acting as an impetus for forging alliances with other countries that share similar fears. But given the existence of large Muslim minorities within the Russian Federation and Moscow's weakness compared to other key international players, should the international landscape once more change, Islam may be used against Russian interests.-
Bibliographical notes
1. Geofrey Sloan, ‘Sir Halford Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then and Now', in Colin S. Grey and Geofrey Sloan (eds.): ‘Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy', London, 1999
2. Anssi Kullberg, ‘From Neo-Eurasianism to National Paranoia: Renaissance of Geopolitics in Russia', The Eurasian Politician, 04.08.2001 / www.cc.jyu.fi
3. Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘The Grand Chessboard – American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives', Basic Books, New York, 1977
4. V. Maksimenko, ‘Central Asia and the Caucasus: Geopolitical Entity Explained', in ‘Central Asia and the Caucasus', 3/2000, Information and Analytical Center, Sweden
5. Anssi Kullberg, ibid
6. ibid. More on A. Dugin's views in www.strana.ru and www.arctogaia.ru
7. Speech of President Putin in the Indian parliament (October 4, 2000)
8. ‘Russia: Putin Notes Extremists, Terror Threat to Republics', (FBIS / SOV – 2000-0519, May 19, 2000)
9. ibid
10. Analysts cite the case of the Tajik civil war. In the words of Sergei Gretsky, it was outside (Russian – Uzbek) influence that turned “civil strife in Tajikistan into civil war”, Sergei Gretski, ‘Civil War in Tajikistan: Causes, Developments, and Prospects for Peace' in ‘Central Asia: Conflict, Revolution, and Change', eds. Roland Sagdeev and Susan Eisenhower (Washington, D.C. : Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 1995), at www.cpss.org/casiabpy_chap_16.txt
11. Vladimir Putin, ‘Rossiya vsegda oshchshala sebia evrosiatskoy stranoy' (Russia always defined itself as a Eurasian country), www.strana.ru, 13.11.2000