Does the deal negotiated with Iran by Turkey and Brazil represent a breakthrough in the larger global nuclear anti-proliferation agenda? Water's Edge columnist Daniel Widome takes a look.
May 28th, 2010
Recent months have been busy ones in the world of nuclear diplomacy. Many of the most important events already have been covered in this space. But this month, signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) gathered in New York to review progress toward the treaty's twin goals of disarmament and nonproliferation. In many ways, this train of nuclear diplomacy has saved its best stop for last, as the NPT represents the foundation of the global nonproliferation regime and review conferences happen only once every five years. But nuclear diplomacy doesn't always proceed according to plan. Amid the backdrop of the NPT review conference emerged two starkly different approaches to dealing with Iran, one of the NPT's most prominent outlaws. One approach came from the usual power brokers on the UN Security Council. But another came from a pair of over-achieving emerging powers and took many observers by surprise. Whether one approach holds more promise than the other is open to debate. But what is certainly clear is that the pivot points of international relations—and not just nuclear diplomacy—are subtly beginning to shift.
Events surrounding Iran's nuclear aspirations have become somewhat predictable in recent years. Despite repeated assertions that it does not seek nuclear weapons, Iran has flouted NPT requirements and maintained secret nuclear facilities that have been off-limits to international inspectors. But unlike fellow scofflaw North Korea, Iran has technically remained a party to the NPT. Although it does not currently possess nuclear weapons, and its claims for not desiring them may be legitimate, it seems clear that at the very least Iran seeks to master the nuclear fuel cycle. This would give Iran “breakout” capacity—it wouldn't have nuclear weapons, but it would have the ability to build them on short notice.
The response of Iran's neighbors both near and far has followed a similar pattern. Given the aggressive statements of Iran's leaders and the country's long-standing support of Hezbollah and Hamas, Israel views the potential of Iranian nuclear weapons as an existential threat. It is consistently at the vanguard of those advocating a strong response to Iran's NPT transgressions. But Israel's unacknowledged nuclear arsenal lies at the core of Iran's public defense of its own nuclear program: How can Israel, a non-NPT state, be allowed to possess nuclear weapons while Iran, which has remained within the NPT, cannot simply pursue nuclear technology? This argument carries a great deal of weight within the region, but others weigh just as heavily. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, for example, share Iran's view about the hypocrisy of Israel's nuclear arsenal. But they view Shia Iran as a challenger to their own Sunni pre-eminence in the Middle East and in the Muslim world. Despite protestations about Israeli nuclear hypocrisy, there is no country in the Middle East that would welcome a nuclear-armed Iran.
Further afield, the UN Security Council has been a key forum for airing claims about Iranian noncompliance and for levying sanctions. The five permanent members plus Germany (known as the “P 5+1”) have represented the principal negotiating team. Although U.S. policy may seem to have changed dramatically when Barack Obama succeeded George Bush, both presidents have followed a relatively consistent course that refuses to condone Iranian nuclear weapons and pushes for escalating sanctions in the face of increasing Iranian noncompliance, while stopping short (so far) of direct military action.
In the past, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany have made their own overtures (as a group) toward Iran, but especially since Obama's election, they have generally followed U.S. policy. China and Russia, on the other hand, have consistently been the greatest hurdles for tougher sanctions on Iran. Russia has provided assistance to Iran's nuclear program in the past and continues to equip Iran's armed forces, and China is a major importer of Iranian oil. Beyond their immediate concerns (or lack thereof) with Iran's nuclear program, both China and Russia view a Western-dominated world order with trepidation. Resistance to tougher sanctions on Iran has been an important way for China and Russia to flex their independent muscles.
But in recent weeks, amid the ongoing NPT review conference, some new players have entered the Iranian nuclear game. With great fanfare, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced a breakthrough deal with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Under the terms of the deal, Iran would ship some of its low enriched uranium to Turkey, which would hold the material until it could be reprocessed to a level of enrichment suitable for civilian use but not for weaponization. The reprocessed uranium then would be returned to Iran for civilian use.
For the United States and its allies, this proposal would remove from Iran some of the material that it could use to develop nuclear weapons. For Iran, the proposal would allow it access to the nuclear material it claims it needs for civilian purposes. The deal is reminiscent of a proposal that fell apart last October that would have had Iran ship some of its low enriched uranium to Russia and France for reprocessing for civilian nuclear use. The quantity to be shipped out of Iran under the Brazilian/Turkish proposal is the same as in the deal of a few months ago. Iran's total stock of uranium, however, has increased significantly since then. Whereas the October deal would have deprived Iran of sufficient uranium to produce a bomb, the Brazilian/Turkish deal would leave Iran with enough material to do just that.
Naturally, the United States and its allies on the Security Council were skeptical of the Brazilian/Turkish proposal. Not only did it seem like a weaker rehashing of their own earlier deal, it seemed to undermine the growing momentum for a new round of tougher sanctions against Iran. As it happens, both Brazil and Turkey currently hold rotating seats on the Security Council. But any effort to undermine the perception of unanimity among the international community—regardless of Security Council votes—could be seen as a boon to the Iranian regime's efforts to stymie Western restrictions on its nuclear program. Indeed, shortly after the Brazilian/Turkish deal was announced, the United States announced a broad agreement (including Russia and China) on a new round of sanctions against Iran. The Security Council could vote on the sanctions in the next month.
Regardless of whether the Brazilian/Turkish deal will trump a new round of sanctions, one thing is particularly noteworthy about this month's spate of diplomacy: Where did Brazil and Turkey come from, and why do they care about the Iranian nuclear program?
The answer is a bit clearer with Turkey, as an immediate neighbor of Iran. Since taking office, Erdogan has earnestly pursued a “zero problems with neighbors” foreign policy. The country has long held a unique strategic position, but a strong government and a growing economy have given Turkey greater clout in the region, and it has attempted to use this clout to resolve regional issues. Relations with Greece, Syria, and Armenia are all remarkably strong, and although Turkey's relations with Israel have become a bit tenser, this is a natural consequence of being more sensitive to regional concerns. Brazil, for its part, is finally realizing its longstanding potential as a global power. Under the successful and dynamic leadership of Lula, Brazil has leveraged its significant economic weight more aggressively on the world stage. Although its appearance in the forum of nuclear diplomacy took some by surprise, what is perhaps more surprising is that it has taken Brazil so long to make its presence felt. It is the ninth largest economy in the world, and many feel it is time it started acting as such.
As with many international relations challenges, Iran's nuclear program is can be viewed through multiple lenses. Regionally, it poses a security risk to Israel, while simultaneously drawing attention to that country's own clandestine nuclear program. It also threatens to escalate the centuries-old duel between Persians and Arabs for pre-eminence in the Muslim world. Globally, Iran's nuclear program presents a major challenge to the nonproliferation regime embodied by the NPT. If nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament are worthy goals (and Obama certainly thinks they are), then Iran's nuclear program must not be allowed to remain opaque and unaccountable. Iran's program represents a profound threat not only to the NPT, but also to the notion that international regimes can define and enforce global norms and address multilateral problems.
But aside from the direct security challenges that Iran's nuclear program presents to its neighbors and the indirect challenges it poses to the effectiveness of global regimes, it also has served to illuminate the shifting balance of power among states in the international system. For the past decade, at least, the issue has served a vehicle for Russia and China to exert their growing and evolving influence on world affairs, primarily due to their permanent membership on the Security Council and to their growing economic clout. But more recently, global upstarts like Brazil and Turkey have inserted themselves into the process. Their motivations are multiple, and are surely self-serving, in part. Regardless of its merits, the Brazilian/Turkish proposal is a serious one, and it demonstrates the emerging “democratization” of the global balance of power. Whether or not this is a good thing is as yet unclear, and so too are the potential winners and losers from a world in which emerging powers exert greater influence. What is clear, however, is that the balance is inexorably shifting, and both the current and emerging powers must quickly learn to operate in this new reality.
Daniel Widome is a San Francisco-based writer and foreign policy analyst.He can be reached at Daniel.Widome@gmail.com