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Hello, and welcome to this week's edition of Global Q&A. I'm Robert

Nolan. Today we are speaking with Professor Fawaz Gerges, the Christian A.

Johnson Chair in International Affairs and Middle Eastern Studies at Sarah

Lawrence College in New York. He is also a consultant and regular commentator for

ABC News, and is one of the world's most sought after experts on Arab politics and the Middle East. Professor Gerges spent two years conducting field research on relations between Islamists and the West in six Arab countries, and is the author of the upcoming book, “The Islamists and the West: Ideology vs. Pragmatism.” Thanks for being with us today Professor Gerges.

FG: My pleasure

A lot of hype is surrounding this week's Arab summit in Beirut. The

pressure is on Israel's Sharon to allow the Palestinian leader Yassir

Arafat travel rights so that he may attend the summit -- where the Saudi proposal for peace in the region will presumably dominate the discussions. You have been critical of

pan-Arab efforts in the past, noting they often result in a lot of talk, followed by little action. How will this week s Arab League Summit differ from

those of

year s past, if at all?

FG: I personally think that the summit of Arab states on Wednesday,

the

27th of March, really promises to be quite historical for three major

reasons. The first reason is that for the first time in the history of

the

Arab-Israeli conflict, all the Arab states collectively are preparing

to

offer not just an olive branch to Israel, but also to send a message of

peace based on the idea that the Arab states will fully normalize

relations

with Israel in return for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied 1967

Arab

territories. It is the first time that the Arab states collectively

have

put on the table a proposal, not just based on the so-called land for

peace

formula, but on full peace for full withdrawal. This is done publicly

and

collectively by all the Arab states and will be fleshed out during the

Summit of Arab states on the 27th of March. This is the first point.

The

second point is that the Arab states are not just willing to say that

they

are willing to normalize relations with Israel fully, but also to have

a

binding legal agreement that is to recognize Israel's borders, and

commit

themselves for a legally binding agreement with Israel, this is the

second

point.

The third point, I think the Arab states seem to be so willing to

compromise

on two major components of any peace settlement. The first one is the

right

for the Palestinian refugees to return, and also on Israel's

sovereignty

over the Wailing Wall, and of course, the Israelis' sovereignty over

some

Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. So I think unlike other

summits of

Arab states, this one promises to be historical because I think the

Arab

states are willing and ready to offer an olive branch, and willing to

commit

themselves publicly and explicitly and collectively, to a comprehensive

and

sweeping settlement, based not on the land for peace formula, but on

fully

normalizing relations with Israel.

You mentioned a little earlier that this is the first Arab League

summit from which

that you expect a truly collective action. Will this summit

result in

a more unified voice from the Arab world? What are some of the

divisive

elements that might come up?

FG: You know, it is ironic that is, for the first time in the history

of

the Arab-Israeli conflict, it seems to me, a relative consensus has

emerged

in the Arab world that the only way to resolve this conflict is for all

of

the Arab states to gather to basically offer what I called the full

normalization of relations for full peace. Even the pariah Iraqi

regime

does not seem to oppose or reject the Saudi peace idea, or peace

initiative.

Hardly any Arab states are on the record opposing or rejecting the

proposed

Saudi Arabian peace initiative that will be fleshed out on Wednesday.

There

is no opposition. All of the pivotal Arab states accept this Saudi

Arabian

peace proposal, and I think this is the fascinating and critical part

that

there is a new consensus that has emerged in the Arab world in the last

six

or seven months.

So you don t think that there will be any divisive elements regarding

refugees returning or the situation in Jerusalem? Are they going to be

discussing these issues at the summit?

FG: In order to avoid, as you said, some of the contentious issues, in

particular, the right of return for Palestinian refuges and the precise

borders of a future Palestine state, I think what the Summit of Arab

States

is basically to have a very ambiguous and very short peace proposal.

It

will be less than one page, stating fully and explicitly and

unambiguously

that is, the Arab states are willing to fully normalize relations with

Israel in return for full withdrawal. I think there will be no major

discussions of the complex issues involved in the peace process. It

will be

a very short and brief statement. Quite ambiguous because if they go

into

the minute details, some major problems, as you said, might arise.

In your most recent op-ed piece appearing in the March 15th edition of

New

York Times, you more or less describe the Middle East conflict as a

prism

through which Arab governments perceive their own internal strife.

Problems

of modernization and relations with the West, for example, are often

defined

within the context of regional conflict and play an important role in

the

identity of the state. Could a move towards peace potentially

destabilize

the way Arab regimes garner public support and stay in power?

FG: For too long, unfortunately, the Arab states have used the

Arab-Israeli

conflict in order to stifle political dissent and to maintain their

authoritarian control over their populations. For too long, I think

the

Arab authoritarian regimes argued that democracy, human rights, reforms

and

liberalization have to wait, because the fight against the so-called

Zionist

enemy takes precedence over everything else. In fact, I would argue

that

the Arab-Israeli conflict has stifled development broadly

defined

in the Arab world and has consolidated the authoritarian political

structure

throughout the Arab world. One would hope that a resolution of this

particularly prolonged conflict, will hammer, I think, a poisonous nail

in

the coffin of the authoritarian state, because after all, it will

expose the

bankruptcy and the authoritarianism of the Arab political order.

So what do Arab governments have to gain from this proposal?

FG: I think some of the Arab states hope somehow that since the Palestinian predicament and the bloody images of Palestinians on Arab satellite stations had become a rallying point for the Islamist opposition forces, and this satisfied and alienated elements in the Arab world. So in fact, the prolonged Palestinian tragedy, has become a major drain on the stability and durability of the Arab state. Arab states hope that, somehow, by

finding a resolution, they will be able to preempt the mainly Islamist opposition

forces. They are hoping that somehow they will be able to maintain control by gradually opening up and reforming the authoritarian structure. So while you might say that a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict might ultimately hammer a nail into the authoritarian Arab state, Arab leaders hope to find ways and mechanisms to preempt the Islamist opposition and

maintain control over their societies.

Will Arab regimes back an attack on Iraq if the U.S. involves itself fairly in the Middle East peace process?

FG: Well, I think the Arab states are terrified that the United States will launch a military campaign against Iraq while the Palestinian suffering continues. I think as a first step the Arab states are impressing on their American allies – listen, you can not really do anything about Iraq without actively engaging in the Arab-Israeli peacemaking and finding a way out of this deadly embrace. So, I think the first priority for the Arab states is basically to break the deadlock on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The second question I think the Arab states would like the United States to exhaust all the traumatic options before even launching a military campaign against Iraq. I think the sanative of the Arab states will be very decisive on this particular question that the Arab states would like the United States to use what is called international legitimacy, in particular the United Nations. First, to impress or even exert pressure on the Saddam Hussein regime to accept international standards and then if the Iraqi regime refuses to do so then somehow a military option can be considered. But I think the highest priority for the Arab regimes in this particular historical juncture is to get the United States to be actively engaged in the Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking. Secondly, to use the agency of the United Nations in order to deal with the question of Iraq. Thirdly, if international diplomatic efforts fail to convince the Iraqi regime, then a military option could be considered.

A few weeks ago, a Gallup Poll told us a little bit about Arab public opinion. While the results were somewhat expected, I think the some of the results are worth mentioning. 61 percent said that they did not believe Arab groups were behind the September 11 attacks, and the language used to describe Americans often included words like ruthless, aggressive, conceited, arrogant, easily provoked and biased. According to Arab

News.com, many Muslims feel the West “pays little attention to their situation, does not attempt to help Islamic countries, and makes few attempts to communicate

or create cross-cultural bridges.” After spending two years traveling

throughout the Arab world doing research, how do your notes compare?

FG: The findings of the Gallup polls in nine Muslim countries really reinforce existing evidence about what I call the deepening anti-American sentiments throughout the Arab and Muslim lands. In fact, I would argue that anti-American sentiments have become a staple of Arab and Muslim politics. To be politically conscious in the Arab and Muslim world today is to be anti-American. I think what the polls also reinforce and show is that not the September 11th attacks against the United States nor the U.S. war against terrorism have dented the anti-American sentiments throughout the Arab and Muslim lands. And this a highly worrying find, in particular it seems to me that the U.S. war against terrorism is beginning rather than ending and this raises questions about the deepening anti-American sentiments, about possibilities of confrontation between the two civilizations, and about the accumulative set of grievances against the United States. Yes, it seems to me that anti-American sentiments has become deeply embedded in most Arab lands. In this particular sense, I think what we need to remember about the Gallup poll is three major points that I highlighted in of my articles on Thursday. I think the first finding is that the freer Muslim societies tend to be have less anti-American sentiments. Ironically, Lebanon and Turkey, two of the freest societies in the Muslim world have the highest ratings of people who look favorably at the United States – 40 and 41 percent in those societies. This tells us that it is in the interest of the United States to somehow nudge their own allies to really open up the political state and integrate the rising social classes into the political field. The second finding is that most people stress the notion of politics rather than culture, in fact many people talked about America in highly positive terms, and in this particular sense its much easier to deal with politics than culture. I think here the more the United States gets engaged in trying to resolve some of the historical conflicts, the less anti-American sentiments will remain in that part of the world. Thirdly, I would argue that the polls do not show the broad spectrum of opinions in Arab and Muslim societies. In fact, in my own research I found that there is a major gap between children and their fathers and grandfathers. The younger the generation tends to be, the more favorable the views of America tend to be. Here, what I would like to say is that 65 percent of the population in Muslim societies are under the age of 25. The more we invest in the education and future of young people in Muslim societies, the more we will be investing in cultural understanding and the more we will address this heightened anti-American sentiments in Muslim societies.

At the onset of the war against terror, you wrote that, to date, the U.S. has failed to successfully communicate its objectives to an already suspicious Arab world. Has Vice President Dick Cheney succeeded in fulfilling that mission during his tour?

FG: This is a very important point because historically speaking the United States has mainly focused on what I call official channels. The United States really practices high politics. The United States has invested very little in what I call civil society, in creating pictures in Muslim civil society. It is ironic, by the way, that Vice President Cheney met basically with the kings, the amirs, the vice presidents, the presidents. He did not meet with a single non-official group in Muslim society. It is really fascinating that the Vice President didn't take the time to meet with the leading editors in the Arab world. The Vice President didn't take the time to meet with civil society opinion makers. The Vice President did not take the time to go to have an interview with some of the Arab television satellite stations. I think that while the Vice President has done a very important job trying to communicate the American perspective to the official establishment in the Arab and Muslim world, I think he did not even take the time to invest in the non-official channel. Since we have been talking about public diplomacy and to appeal directly to the so-called Arab street of public opinion, it seems to me that Vice President Cheney unfortunately does not appreciate the importance of communicating directly with Arab public opinion and opinion makers.

Would you say that that is a problem with U.S. foreign policy in terms of building bridges?

FG:Absolutely. Again, this is what I call a part of the official mind set in Washington, D.C. I think American politicians find it much easier to deal with the official channels – the kings, the amirs, and the presidents. This is what conventional American diplomacy has been all about. We hoped after 9/11 that the United States would shift gears and the United States would invest considerably in non-official channels, in building bridges through Muslim civil societies, in really showing the human face of America. America is as much interested in the question of oil and the question of trade, the Arab-Israeli conflict but also interested in communicating directly with opinion makers, public opinion and civil society. It seems to me so far that we have not invested or taken the time, energy and resources to reorient our own diplomacy. I think the Vice President's mission is a case in point.

Professor Gerges, thank you so much for talking with us today. We really appreciate it here at the Foreign Policy Association. We wish you the best in your continued work.

FG: Thank you