In Focus

Hail to the Boxer President

Kadyrov's assassination was not a defeat for Moscow. Nor will the choice of Kadyrov's thuggish son as successor prove to be.

by Nabi Abdullaev

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To some it seemed like a defeat for Moscow. At the most important event on one of the most significant days in the Russian calendar—Victory Day, 9 May—Chechnya's President, Akhmad Kadyrov, was blown up along with other senior figures in the pro-Moscow administration. There could have been no more symbolic strike.

But this was not a defeat for Moscow. If Kadyrov had been killed by a vengeful mob angry at his relations with Moscow and human rights abuses, if a popular uprising had followed the assassination—that would have been a defeat.

Nor was Kadyrov's killing even a political disaster. The bomb that went off below the stand where Kadyrov was watching a military parade has tested the political machinery that Kadyrov created in Chechnya, and so far no threatening cracks have emerged.

There has been no visible infighting in Chechnya's clannish, dog-eat-dog establishment. There have been no popular protests on the streets. Nor, even, have there been follow-up terrorist attacks that would have destabilized the situation further and given the separatist rebels an even louder voice and more room to maneuver in the ensuing muddle.

In death, Kadyrov has demonstrated what he built in life. And this self-willed and savvy politician seems to have accomplished a lot: even decapitated, the pro-Russian Chechen state, which now numbers thousands of local officials, shows no signs of collapsing. Elected in a sham vote last year, with other contenders effectively pulled from the race by the Kremlin, Kadyrov had managed to edge separatists out and begin the economic and political reconstruction of Chechnya.

It is now up to Moscow to decide who will continue to deliver what Kadyrov had been delivering: loyalty and stability in Chechnya.

A 'Vacuum' Already Filled

That might seem difficult. After all, the strong feeling among most observers is that Kadyrov's death has left a deep political vacuum in Chechnya. The Kremlin has helped create that impression by consistently staking so much on Kadyrov and by tolerating a great deal from him. Kadyrov was tolerated—eventually even winning stronger backing—despite sacking three Moscow-appointed prime ministers for Chechnya in a row and despite an administrative revolt just months before being elected president, in which he replaced every key figure in the Chechen administration whom Moscow had thrust on him. The Kremlin ignored their replacement by Kadyrov's kin and loyalists, ignored Kadyrov's tolerance of human rights abuses, and brushed off numerous accusations about Kadyrov's style of governance and murky deals with funds earmarked for Chechnya's reconstruction effort.

Nor is there a prominent Chechen of Kadyrov's caliber capable of leading the republic: in clearing the way for its favorite, the Kremlin removed local rivals. Nor is there a Moscow-based Chechen politician who could fly down to Grozny and gain power. A Chechen leader needs a power base on the ground, and in Chechnya that power traditionally comes through the barrel of a gun.

All this lends some weight to the notion, promoted by some Russian politicians, that Moscow should reimpose direct rule. In practice, though, that would be both a defeat and a disaster. It would deprive Chechnya of Kadyrov's most valuable legacy, a pro-Russian Chechen political system. Moscow paid heavily in blood and money for that.

So far Moscow has not shown any intention of taking back some of the power it has been giving to Chechnya over the past year and a half. This “Chechenization” of power in the republic will continue, and there will be no shortage of Chechens wishing to succeed Kadyrov. In that sense, the notion of a vacuum hardly applies to Chechnya. Time may be short—four months remain until the next presidential elections—but in those months the Kremlin can find another loyal and strong minion to rule Chechnya. After all, wasn't Putin himself catapulted to power in about the same period of time back in 1999? With a flourish of the checkbook that Moscow always has open for Chechnya, the Kremlin could with relative ease promote someone from obscurity and transform him into a political bulldozer.

The problem is that there is already another bulldozer on the scene: the youngest of Kadyrov's four sons, Ramzan. A 27-year-old boxing champion, Ramzan heads a 1,500-strong presidential guard that is, in effect, a private army. He may have failed in his responsibility to protect his father on 9 May, but Ramzan knows how to look after himself. He has a well-deserved reputation as a thug. In person and through his squads, he has tortured suspected rebels and inflicted widespread abuse on the local population.

The Kremlin therefore has a choice: it can promote Ramzan to the presidency or it can choose a minion, in the process either opening a schism in the volatile Chechen power structure or creating a bogus leader, with Ramzan running the republic behind his back.

Moscow seems already to have made its choice. Witness how Putin summoned Ramzan to the Kremlin within hours of his father's death. Witness Ramzan's appointment as Chechnya's deputy prime minister days later. Witness Putin's flying visit to Grozny on 12 May to pay his condolences to Kadyrov's family in person.

HOW TO MANAGE A PRESIDENT

There are technical problems for Moscow. Ramzan is under 30, the lower limit for a presidential candidate according to the Chechen constitution. But that is hardly an obstacle. A court could easily strike that provision down as discriminatory (and courts all over Russia's regions have consistently shown their willingness to remove obstacles to the election of the “right” people).

Likewise the Kremlin should not find it difficult to pull the political strings that attach Ramzan to Moscow. Choosing Ramzan is not just the least contentious option for the Kremlin; it is also the least threatening to Russia's policy in Chechnya.

His loyalty is unquestioned. In the mid-1990s, his father was one of the most outspoken separatist Chechen leaders. After changing sides, Kadyrov became the most aggressive guardian of the pro-Moscow regime in Chechnya. Ramzan will follow suit.

Though more noted for destruction than construction, Ramzan can be expected to continue his father's efforts to rebuild Chechnya. Kadyrov Sr. was a mufti, a religious scholar by education and not an economist, but, supported by specialists, he was quite successful in the reconstruction effort. These same people are in place and will support Kadyrov Jr. (or anyone else the Kremlin chooses).

Indeed, Moscow could end up with more influence. Over the next four months, there will be virtually nothing to prevent the Kremlin from staffing Chechnya's political structures with its agents of influence. That would have been impossible under Akhmad Kadyrov, who rigorously purged his staff of Moscow's appointees. Moscow's men will be at hand to guide Ramzan Kadyrov. They could also become a strong check on him.

Both guidance and a check will be needed. What Ramzan lacks is the political talent of his father and his experience of leadership, and what he has--a reputation for violence even uglier than that of Russian troops--needs curbing. Russia may have a bad record in Chechnya, but what appalls many Chechens more than the brutality of the traditional enemy, Russia, is that their own kind are conducting brutal “mopping-up” operations. Operating in a bureaucracy will expose Ramzan to some political mechanisms other than taking hostages--which is exactly what he did recently to lure the former minister of defense in Aslan Maskhadov's separatist government out of the woods. Operating with a bureaucracy may also change the lines of command between Ramzan and his gunmen: as a cabinet minister now and a president later, more administrative layers can be expected to appear between him and his troops.

Overall, there's no indication yet that Chechnya will be very much worse off under Kadyrov Jr. than it was under his father. After all, Akhmad Kadyrov made no obvious attempt to curb the brutal turns of his son.

Whether Chechnya actually becomes better will depend on the Kremlin and how it handles and shapes the Chechen political configuration in the nearest four months.

The elevation of a brute is unlikely, of course, to make the situation in Chechnya look any better in the eyes of Western critics and most independent Russian Chechnya observers. In a class on game theory, one of my Harvard professors encouraged students to demand inflated salaries at interviews with employers. “It is just 30 seconds of embarrassment,” he said. “Don't lose a chance to get what you can.”

Picking Ramzan as the ruler of Chechnya would mean little more than 30 seconds of embarrassment for the Kremlin. And after years of being lashed for its handling of events in Chechnya, that is not too much to endure.

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