In Focus

Iraq: Emerging from the Storm?

By Marco Vicenzino

December 15, 2005

Iraq's parliamentary election technically marks the full restoration of its national sovereignty. Higher voter participation may not be directly attributable to conviction with the democratic process itself, for such an outlook requires time to develop. The primary motivating factor remains sectarian interest, that is, to have one's community acquire as much influence and decision-making power as possible, with the knowledge that this election provides the final opportunity to do so for the next four years. However, the willingness by many to resort to the ballot box, or at least to give it a try, in resolving differences remains fundamentally essential in the gradual evolution of Iraq's political culture.

Another motivating factor is fear of the alternative to the ballot box, that is, an acknowledgment that should the electoral and political process collapse, the alternative may be civil war and fragmentation of the country. Although the precise and eventual outcome of such a worst-case scenario is unpredictable, turbulence, turmoil and disastrous consequences for many is certainly guaranteed.

As the process of forming a new government moves forward, violence will continue as an effective and sophisticated insurgency aims to destabilize the country by targeting all foreign military and civilian personnel, Iraqis that collaborate and participate in the process of rebuilding their nation and, above all, innocent Iraqi civilians who constitute the overwhelming majority of casualties.

The new government that emanates from the election must pursue the essential tasks of effective outreach to the Sunni community and fostering political, inter-ethnic and inter-religious reconciliation; improving Iraq's security forces with critical U.S. assistance and additional training from NATO member states and others; and resolving many outstanding issues left unsettled during the process of drafting the new constitution last summer.

The concept of federalism remains essential to Iraq's future. There must be significant separation of powers between the central government in Baghdad and provincial authorities. This depends upon compromise and not the winner-take-all approach, which is a major challenge for Iraq's political culture.

Negotiations between different ethnic and religious groups will continue to prove contentious, particularly on the issues of territorial boundaries and devolution of power. Kurds will seek to expand the boundaries of an autonomous Kurdish region in a federal Iraq to include the strategically important city of Kirkuk, the oil center of northern Iraq holding 15% of national oil reserves and which the Kurds claim as their historic capital. Although the new constitution requires a referendum on the final status of Kirkuk before the end of 2007, its fragile ethnic balance remains a powder keg that could trigger civil war between Kurds and Arabs and engulfing Iraq's neighbors, specifically Turkey, which is covetous of the oil, protective of Kirkuk's Turkish minority and eternally fearful of Kurdish separatist aspirations that could influence Turkey's significant Kurdish minority.

After more than a decade of de facto independence, the Kurds remain wary of making further concessions to the central government in Baghdad, even with a Kurdish president as head of the recent government. Despite these obstacles, the Shiites and Kurds have developed a significant working relationship. As Saddam's most repressed victims, they have the most to gain from a new federal Iraq. Many Shiites will continue using the example of Kurdish autonomy to push for a similar arrangement of a federal region in the predominantly Shiite south where nearly 85% of Iraq's oil reserves lie. During the constitution-drafting process last summer, the method for forming federal regions in the south and center was deliberately deferred to a new parliament in an attempt to appease Sunni Arabs, whose firm opposition stems from fear of being denied the benefits of Iraq's oil riches. However, deferral is unlikely to prevent the formation of new federal regions as the new parliament will still be dominated by a Shiite and Kurdish majority.

Engaging the Sunni community, approximately 20% of Iraq's population, in the process remains the new government's greatest political challenge. When compared to the January and October 2005 votes, Sunni voter participation will likely increase, primarily in the community's heartland in central Iraq. However, it may not be enough to provide an accurate measure of the community's aspirations, soothe its fears and provide a real sense of inclusion. This can clearly impact the election's legitimacy to many in Iraq and throughout the Middle East, particularly in the region's Sunni-majority states.

Obviously, Sunnis fear a future of being reduced to a minority status and being deprived of the benefits of the dominant community, principally in terms of rank, privilege and entitlement. Among Sunnis, there is also fierce opposition to a foreign presence in their land which emanates from an explosive combination of fervent religiosity and ardent nationalism. In addition, those Sunnis who wish to participate in the election may be very reluctant due to fear of reprisals from insurgents.

The new government must continue the process of trying to isolate the more radical and rejectionist elements and involve the moderate majority with incentives and assurances of equal status, rights and opportunities. The new government must appoint Sunni officials to prominent positions, particularly in the key ministries of justice, interior and defense.

Without Sunni participation, there can be no peace in Iraq. The alternative scenario is civil war, disintegration and the Lebanonization of the country with disastrous consequences for ordinary Iraqis, Iraq's neighbors, regional stability and international security. Like Afghanistan in the 90's, Iraq will increasingly become a haven for extremists. Unlike Afghanistan, Iraq possesses the world's second largest oil reserves. With direct access to profits, radical elements could finance lethal operations throughout the world.

The new government's greatest practical challenge is expanding its security forces and improving operational capabilities. Efficiency has gradually increased and desertions have significantly decreased. However, the situation is far from ideal and will require a U.S. presence for a considerable time. Although many NATO states have contributed to training Iraqi forces, greater international involvement is needed, particularly inside Iraq. The insurgency has grown increasingly sophisticated, primarily at developing explosive devices such as roadside bombs, which are responsible for most U.S. casualties.

U.S. engagement remains essential to Iraq's future. It must provide all the necessary resources to ensure that Iraq emerges from the current turbulence and turmoil. The leaders of the new government must demonstrate unity, transparency and accountability and earn the credibility necessary to convince ordinary Iraqis that the current cycle of violence and instability can be dramatically reduced. Overcoming challenges on the economic front, such as attacking the endemic corruption and reducing the exorbitant level of unemployment, remain key elements to achieving success.

Iraq's neighbors prefer a weak central government in Baghdad capable of providing basic domestic order but pliant and vulnerable to their influence, particularly in Iraq's bordering provinces, and ultimately dependent upon them to guarantee stability. Syria will do just enough to say it is helping the U.S. effort and nothing beyond. It seeks to defuse increasing U.S. pressure emanating from the UN's investigation into the Hariri assassination and wishes to avoid the fate of Libya after Lockerbie which culminated in years of devastating multilateral UN sanctions. Syria is also carefully trying to monitor its own extremists, and their sympathizers, that cross the border into Iraq. If they are killed in Iraq, less future worries for Assad. If they return, their identities will be referenced in case of future necessity. Recent disturbances within Syria have reinforced this view. Furthermore, the Syrian regime's slaughter of thousands of Islamic fundamentalists at Hama in 1982 provides a reminder. Jordan's fears of the domestic impact of extremist activities in Iraq, as demonstrated by the recent attacks in Amman, are accompanied by hopes for greater stability that would yield significant economic dividends through increased trade via its port of Aqaba.

Iran hopes for more Shiite clerical influence in the new Iraqi government, while Turkey is eternally vigilant of activities in the Kurdish north. Saudi Arabia's principal concerns lie with Sunni extremist activities crossing its border with Iraq and closely observing Iraqi Shiite influence on its own restive Shiites in Arabia's east.

What will be the election's results?

The new Iraqi government will not look like the theocratic regime in Iran nor a secular, western-oriented body as preferred by the U.S.. However, religion will clearly maintain an important role. Moderate Shiite Islamists are likely to continue dominating the new government with significant Shiite clerical influence, but with fewer votes and in alliance with a politically united and formidable Kurdish presence. However, a secular-nationalist opposition may emerge under the leadership of figures such as former prime minister, Iyad Allawi, that may appeal to secular Shiites and Sunnis in the political center. Although such an opposition may participate either directly or indirectly in a grand coalition government of national unity, it will attempt to distinguish itself and maintain a separate political entity.

Thus far, the moderate Shiites, and particularly Grand Ayatollah Sistani, have proven responsible in restraining the more radical elements, particularly within the context of attacks aimed at Shiite targets, which are designed to provoke a violent Shiite reaction that would spark a civil war.

Due to necessity, a predominantly Shiite-controlled government will continue tolerating a U.S. presence to prevent national fragmentation and disintegration. However, like many Iraqis, and many outside Iraq, they wish to see a significant reduction in U.S. troops and eventual withdrawal when, and if, a sufficient level of normality and stability is restored over time.

Marco Vicenzino is the founder and Executive Director of the Global Strategy Project. He served as Deputy Executive Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies-US (IISS-US) in Washington, DC, and is an international attorney. He is a graduate of Oxford University and Georgetown University Law Center and has taught International Law at the School of International Service of American University. He can be contacted at msv@globalsp.org

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Overview

Since the fall of Baghdad to American forces in May 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority, led by American diplomat L. Paul Bremer, has had the final say in the governance of Iraq. Issues of security and the challenges of reconstruction have plagued the political transition from the repressive dictatorship of the recently captured Saddam Hussein to the U.S. appointed Iraqi Governing Council and, eventually, a democratically elected government in Baghdad. This tenuous and ongoing project lies at the heart of what U.S. President George Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell have called a “generational commitment” by the United States to bring democracy to the Middle East.

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
Official Web Site.

Full text of the transitional Basic Law
Coalition Provisional Authority

Profiles of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC)

Vision for Success for America, Middle East, and the World

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell

Political Transition

Despite ongoing security problems, the political transition in Iraq headed up by the U.S.-led CPA has proceeded more or less at its own pace. Facing growing pressures both within Iraq and from the international community, however, the CPA recently announced that it would move up its timetable for restoring Iraqi sovereignty to June of 2004. While the new target date will surely satisfy those who wish to see the U.S. ease its occupation of Iraq, some critics say that the new date does not allow enough time to sort out issues concerning governance of the ethnically divided nation and the establishment of effective democratic institutions, for example a strong judicial system capable of trying Saddam Hussein and other suspected war criminals.

Transitional Administrative Law

Analysis and Commentary on Iraqi's Interim Constitution by Nathan J. Brown

Iraq: One Year After

Report on Iraqi political transitions, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations

A Political Transition in Iraq: report of the fact-finding mission

United Nations

In Iraqi Towns, Electoral Experiment finds some Success

The Washington Post Foreign Service

Saddam Hussein as a P.O.W

Human Rights Watch

Debt and Reconstruction

The recent appointment of former Secretary of State James Baker as President Bush's special envoy for Iraqi debt has yielded much success in alleviating what some estimate at nearly $326 billion owed by the former regime to countries from Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Though last month's announcement from the Pentagon that only countries that supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq would be eligible to bid on primary contracts for reconstruction caused something of an uproar in the international community, many nations, including Japan, France and Germany, have said they are willing to be flexible on the issue, hoping to gain sub-contracts and other awards. A link to a comprehensive list of contract distribution can be found below.

Low Intensity Conflict and Nation-Building in Iraq: A Chronology

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Paying for Iraq's Reconstruction

United States Congressional Budget Office

Iraq's $326 Billion Debt, War Claims May Complicate Rebuilding

Bloomberg News

Awarded Contracts & Grants in Iraq
U.S. Department of Commerce

Security

With attacks on coalition troops continuing on a daily basis, security remains a top priority for both Iraqis and the occupying authority. The number of post-war deaths of American soldiers reached its peak at the end of 2003, and coordinated attacks continue despite the capture of Saddam Hussein. The U.S. Army recently announced a “stop loss” initiative, which states that “active-duty Soldiers currently serving in Iraq and Afghanistan will not be allowed to separate or retire until after their unit redeploys.” It is also offering a $10,000 bonus incentive to soldiers whose duty has been served to reenlist. British authorities also recently announced that it expects to keep troops in Iraq until at least 2006. Despite the initial disbanding of the Iraqi army by the CPA under L. Paul Bremer, authorities are hastily undertaking the training of Iraqi military and police forces to deal with the ongoing violence.

Iraq: Building a New Security Structure
International Crisis Group

Stop Loss expands to keep Soldiers in the fight

U.S. Army Press Release

Media Coverage

In wartime, the media is often criticized as being one-sided, unreliable in its findings, and even too gruesome in its coverage. Journalists in Iraq have had to balance these criticisms in addition to others with their perception of the day-to-day atrocities occurring in the war-torn nation. Coverage during the build-up to the war in Iraq and its aftermath has proven the point that the media does have a bearing influence over the hearts and minds of the American public. In an effort to produce first-hand depictions of the war, American journalists enrolled in the Pentagon-sponsored ‘Embedded Program,' which placed them within military units throughout the country. Gruesome attacks such as those in Fallujah on March 31st have called into question the extent by which the media should cover such violent events. How has the press performed in Iraq over the last year? The following links explore this topic in depth.

Misperceptions, the Media and the War on Iraq

PIPA Report

When News is Gruesome, What is too Graphic?

Wall Street Journal

7 of Top 20 Papers Published Front-Page Fallujah Body Photos

Editor and Publisher Magazine

Democracy and Human Rights

Democratizing Iraq has so far proven to be no easy task for the Bush Administration and coalition forces. Although progress has been made on some fronts (the capture of Saddam Hussein and the completion of an Iraqi Constitution to name a few), a number of challenges continue to rattle the stability of the democratic initiative there. The rising death toll (more than 600 since the end of official hostilities) due to increased terrorist activity has prompted critics to argue that a June 30th transition of power is unrealistic. In addition, human rights violations have been ignored to a great extent by occupying forces and authorities within Iraq. With the official date of for political transition set for June 30th, 2004, events in the coming months will determine the likelihood of this transition being a success.

Democracy in Iraq?

Report from Brookings Institute

One year on the human rights situation remains dire

Amnesty International

Iraq's Democractic Revolution

Article from Coalition Provisional Authority

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