The Electoral Stalemate's Impact Beyond Germany

September 22, 2005

by Marco Vicenzino

The resulting electoral deadlock in the world's third largest economy will have a serious impact beyond its borders, principally for the European Union and transatlantic relations. As the European Union's most populous nation and leading economy, strong German leadership is necessary, not only in the economic realm, but politically and diplomatically as well, particularly since the French and Dutch rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty that has provoked a sense of aimlessness throughout the EU.

From an economic perspective, German guidance is needed to provide impetus to other continental economies, principally France and Italy, to overhaul their overburdened state systems with respect to pensions, labor regulation and healthcare. The newly admitted EU member states of Eastern Europe yearn for the return of an economically resurgent Germany from which to benefit, preferred a clear Merkel victory to end Schroeder's special relationship with Russia's Putin and crave for a shift back to Helmut Kohl's policy of closer engagement with Eastern Europe.

Germany's electoral stalemate also creates greater ambiguity concerning the issue of Turkish accession to the EU, particularly as formal talks begin on October 3rd. Although Christian Democratic Party (CDU) leader, Angela Merkel, is opposed to Turkish membership but supports a special relationship, officially the U.S. continues to advocate Turkish inclusion. However, the U.S. has accepted that it's ultimately a domestic EU issue and is far from willing to risk excessive political capital to advance its official position. Some may even prefer an outright EU rejection of Turkey as an opportunity for Washington to seize the political initiative to strengthen U.S.-Turkish relations.

The Bush administration obviously hoped an unequivocal CDU victory would have vastly increased prospects for a new and significantly improved transatlantic relationship. Although Merkel was an advocate of the Iraq invasion, a sweeping CDU victory would not have altered Germany's Iraq policy due to the inevitability of a domestic backlash, particularly from within her own party.

Following the reelection of George Bush in November 2004, the U.S.-German relationship took a pragmatic turn due to a realization by Bush and Schroeder that they had no other choice but deal with each other for the immediate future. Although there was some substance to the improved relationship, to a considerable extent it was a rhetorical shift and the potential for dissension remained. The Bush administration was briefly reminded of this when at an August campaign rally Schroeder specifically renounced the use of force in dealing with Iran. The U.S. administration was concerned that publicly renouncing all options, principally removing the threat of the use of force, could weaken the united transatlantic position in negotiations with Iran. Concerns grew that Schroeder would again play his Iraq card, which together with his handling of the floods that struck Germany, won him the September 2002 election by the narrowest of margins, and seriously damaged U.S.-German relations months before the Iraq invasion.

The Iran episode was short-lived as Germany's election was firmly focused on domestic issues. Although it was partly attributed to political grandstanding, it was interpreted as a warning to many in the Bush administration of the continuing potential for discord should Schroeder remain as chancellor. However, it must be noted that current EU cooperation over Iran is due to several factors including the realization that Iran possesses missile technology that can strike continental Europe. Another factor is the danger of proliferation in a world where non-state actors are determined to inflict unprecedented damage and irresponsible state actors can facilitate this process by engaging in the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials.

The rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in May 2005 was welcomed by many in the U.S. defense and foreign policy establishment. The prevailing concern was that the Treaty's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was a Chiracian device to undermine NATO and create a separate EU security identity to serve as a counterweight to U.S. hegemony to achieve a multi-polar world. It was hoped that a clear-cut CDU victory would mark the final nail in the coffin of CFSP. The lingering fear is that, despite the French and Dutch rejection of the Treaty, CSFP lies dormant but not dead. With Schroeder in power, its potential reactivation or resurrection remains possible. The same logic applies to the issue of the lifting of the EU arms embargo against China. Although it appears currently sidelined, there is still fear in Washington of its potential reemergence, particularly should Schroeder remain as chancellor.

Furthermore, many in Washington hoped that an unambiguous CDU victory would have increased the potential for an eventual rise in German military spending. The U.S. defense establishment expects greater burden-sharing from European NATO member states, principally from larger states like Germany. At present, Germany's military capacity is stretched to its limits, principally in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Simply put, Germany is doing all it can when considering the available resources. Although in principle many in Washington appreciate the German contribution, in real and practical terms it is still viewed as negligible when considering the broader magnitude of existing operations, not to mention potential hotspots that could unexpectedly require immediate intervention in the future.

Obviously, a clear-cut CDU victory would have led to a greater improvement in U.S.-German relations but not the dramatic shift that many in the U.S. would have hoped for. Some in Washington are still unable to accept that the days of Helmut Kohl will not return. The continuing U.S.-German relationship will be more sober and further rooted in the pursuit of respective interests and less on common values. Whether he stays or goes, Schroeder set a new course for German foreign policy marked by a more assertive pursuit of national interest and identity. It may remain subject to debate whether this shift was more rhetorical than substantive, but it is undeniable that the course is now irreversible regardless of who becomes German Chancellor. Concerned figures in Washington have no option but to accept this reality.

Marco Vicenzino is the founder and Executive Director of the Global Strategy Project. He served as Deputy Executive Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies-US (IISS-US) in Washington, DC, and is an international attorney. He is a graduate of Oxford University and Georgetown University Law Center and has taught International Law at the School of International Service of American University. He can be contacted at msv@globalsp.org

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