Army Officers Aren't Impressed by the Civilian Command

September 29, 2005

by Sarwar A. Kashmeri

Each year the Army selects 400 officers for its 10-month course at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pa. Students spend around 20 years in the Army and attain the rank of lieutenant colonel before they are eligible. The War College is a mid-career way station, a time to recharge batteries and pick up the strategic and senior command skills that are necessary for further advancement. It is rare for a lieutenant colonel to be promoted without first graduating from the War College, and it would be hard to name a well-known general who has not attended the college.

In a remarkably far-sighted exercise, the Army invites civilians from across the country to join the students during the last week of the course in what is called the National Security Seminar. The seminar enables these civilians to get to know some of the prospective Army leaders and, in turn, permits the students to better understand the society they serve. Guests are encouraged to become active participants in seminar discussions, sharing from their own background their ideas on the issues being discussed. To encourage a free flow of ideas, the seminar prohibits quoting participants by name.

I was fortunate to have been selected as a representative of Vermont this year and joined the seminar in early June for what turned out to be a remarkable week of discovery.

The officers I met are highly skilled, dedicated professionals, trained to execute orders and lead troops in combat. Most have graduate degrees and have served overseas. They back the American mission in Iraq, but most of the ones I spoke to were openly critical of the lack of planning that allowed the insurgency to grow and become so lethal. A large percentage of the student body had served in Iraq. Few would volunteer for duty in Iraq again, though they would serve unhesitatingly if called upon to do so.

A recently retired senior officer who had been intimately involved with the Iraq war gave one of the four keynote speeches. The officer glibly maintained that, prior to invading Iraq, no one had seriously proposed that a larger force than the one used would be required to pacify Iraq. After a decision is made to overthrow the head of state of a country, the officer said, the aftermath cannot be planned for, so the insurgency in Iraq is just one of those things that happen during war. He predicted that many of those listening to him would go back to Iraq.

During discussions of the speech the next day, it was soon obvious that the students were livid at what they had heard. Anyone who thinks the Army is a monolithic organization not given to criticizing superior officers (as I must confess I was before that week) would be stunned at what followed. Officer after officer cut the speaker to shreds with remarks that dismissed his observations as revisionist history, a Rotary Club speech and an insult to his profession and audience. By raising questions about why they should be loyal to such a man, the officers essentially challenged the Army's code of blind loyalty to superior officers.

Later that day, an officer told a group of us that when he was ordered to take his battalion to Afghanistan, he was told he could take only half of it. Higher-ups had determined the exact number of troops required for victory, and the full battalion would have exceeded that. Most officers I spoke to were disappointed that higher-ups were not nailed after Abu Ghraib. They believed that what took place there was well known and unacceptable.

Two things drive me to write this article. First, as an American, I was honored to be in the company of so many bright, driven and dedicated soldiers, and I wish everyone in the country could have shared this experience. The Army will be in able hands as this class fills the top layers of command.

Second, and by far the more important reason for writing, is that the seminar exposed me to questions that many of these officers would dearly like to pose to this country's political leaders if they were not in uniform. Looking at the situation on the ground in Iraq, they would ask, does anyone really think that we believe assurances from our leaders that they have the best interests of the American soldier at heart? Do you really think that we believe for a moment that the survival of the American way of life is at stake when we and our families are the only ones making sacrifices, while the rest of the country continues to maintain its MTV lifestyle, just as it did before 9/11? Why were we let down by those who didn't listen to military experts who foresaw the need for an adequate number of troops?

We understand, the students would continue, that ours is not to reason why, and we will continue to do as we are commanded, but we would like you to think about these questions as you look at yourself in the mirror each morning.

Sarwar A. Kashmeri is a Fellow of the Foreign Policy Association .This Op-Ed first appeared in The Valley News of New Hampshire on September 27, 2005. He can be contacted at SKashmeri@aol.com

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