A Defeat for Domestic Terrorism in Spain

by Marco Vicenzino

March 24, 2006

The official beginning of the ETA's permanent cease-fire on March 24th amounts to a political defeat for its violent campaign but not its end. However, it could potentially mark the beginning of a long process to end its quest, through the use of terrorist tactics, for an independent Basque homeland extending from the three Basque-speaking provinces of northeastern Spain across the Pyrenees into the three Basque-speaking provinces of southwestern France. Since beginning operations in the 1960's, the ETA's violent campaign has claimed over 800 lives, including government officials and ordinary civilians.

Unlike previous short-lived cease-fires, the current one includes the term "permanent" which provides hope for many Spaniards, who according to polls appear to favor negotiations. However, even the term "permanent" is no firm guarantee that the cease-fire will be maintained making it far from irreversible. Obviously one must proceed with extreme caution and be wary about the intentions behind the cease-fire. Part of ETA's reasoning may be that they are likely to get a better deal from a Socialist government rather than one led by the center-right Popular party. Furthermore, the cease-fire may also provide an opportunity for ETA to re-organize, re-arm and prepare itself should any eventual talks collapse.

In addition, the cease-fire may also represent a pragmatic short-term tactical shift which requires adapting to current realities and temporarily settling for something less than full independence, details of which are to be determined in talks. However, without fully renouncing or abandoning the long-term goal of independence which the ETA calculates may be realized by future generations of Basques. In the period preceding the cease-fire declaration, conflicting messages were emerging from the ETA reflecting a divided leadership struggling to define a coherent agenda. However, this apparent split in leadership may also be interpreted as a deliberate policy of constructive ambiguity designed to keep the government guessing as to ETA's intentions, while in reality the ETA is prepared with an agenda to begin talks. Regardless of which interpretation is more accurate, the coming months will provide the organization's leadership with ample time to consolidate a comprehensive agenda should talks begin. Many contentious issues such as disarmament and the status of prisoners will dominate. However, until then the daily realities of ETA intimidation, coercion and extortion of individuals and businesses in the Basque region and its engagement in other forms of illicit and criminal activities will not change anytime soon.

The ETA's decline effectively began in the late 90's when Spanish and French authorities collectively launched an offensive to pursue and penetrate the ETA on both sides of the Spanish-French border which resulted in the jailing of most of its leadership. Before then, the deficiency of French authorities to crack down on ETA activities contributed to a haven for many ETA fugitives in southwest France (in addition to other ETA sanctuaries in Latin America). The ETA's decline clearly demonstrates the importance of international cooperation and coordination in the struggle against organizations that use terrorism as a means to further ends.

However, as Spanish authorities focused all their efforts on the four-decade old adversary, a new threat was emerging in the form of an international movement rooted in a fundamentalist and radical interpretation of Islam which struck Madrid on March 11th, 2003 claiming 192 innocent civilians (although speculation persists of involvement by domestic terrorist groups in Spain). These attacks had the unintended effect of dealing the ETA a massive political blow as the reaction to terrorism throughout Spain and beyond detracted whatever support or sympathy may have existed for the ETA or any other organization using political violence that deliberately targets individuals, whether civilians or government officials.

The evolution of the ETA broadly appears to follow a common pattern of many secular terrorist movements which often emanate from real, perceived or fabricated political grievances; growing increasingly influential through violent tactics; becoming more radical and corrupt which creates resentment among the very constituents from which it seeks support; leading to ideological erosion whereby the organization continues to promote the ideological rhetoric of its original mission while in reality only aspires to self-preservation, continuation and survival of its power-structure through which it enjoys prestige, status, and privileges.

Although the ETA's announcement amounted to a political defeat of its terrorist campaign, one should not underestimate its continuing potential and operational ability to wreak havoc or exclude the possibility of splinter groups emerging, composed primarily of ETA's more radical elements that may refuse to renounce violence. After the beginning of peace talks between the IRA (Irish Republican Army) and British government, the Real-IRA broke off from the formal IRA and was responsible for the massive Omagh bombing in August 1998 which claimed 29 lives.

An effective campaign of terror inflicting significant damage may be waged by a few committed, disciplined and well-organized radicals. Criminal activities can continue to provide a source of financing, but the ability to execute a sustainable long-term strategy involving violence also requires a certain level of grass-roots sympathy. Considering the limited supply of such sympathy for any radical movement in post-March 11th Spain and the existing and continuous threat of radical jihadist groups in Spain, Europe and beyond, the long-term survivability of any ETA-splinter group remains a significant challenge.

Ultimately, if there are any concessions during or after any eventual peace talks, they must amount to nothing more than a matter of degrees, at most something nominally symbolic but fully less than face-saving. Simply put, the permanent cease-fire was made by an ideologically bankrupt organization that exerts influence and continues to survive as an organized criminal entity.

Marco Vicenzino is the founder and Executive Director of the Global Strategy Project. He served as Deputy Executive Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies-US (IISS-US) in Washington, DC, and is an international attorney. He is a graduate of Oxford University and Georgetown University Law Center and has taught International Law at the School of International Service of American University. He can be contacted at msv@globalsp.org

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