In Focus

The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War
By Andrew J. Bacevich

Reviewed by

John Temple Swing

Andrew J. Bacevich, a professor of

international relations and director

of the Center for International

Relations at Boston University, has

provided us with a thoughtful and

provocative study of many of the

strands in the American body

politic that led to President Bush's

invasion of Iraq in 2003. Andrew

Bacevich writes from the unique

perspective of a military officer

who, following graduation from

West Point, saw service in

Vietnam.

Militarism in America is hardly

new. We can find precursors of

today's situation in the annexation

of large parts of Mexico in the

1850s, in the conquest of Spain's

colonies of Cuba and the

Philippines in the 1890s, and in the

invasions of Grenada and Panama

in the 1980s. Professor Bacevich,

however, starts his story with

President Wilson's idealism, as

expressed in his Fourteen Points,

and most importantly, with the

ideal of creating a peaceful world

in which democracies can flourish.

It is ironic that today, Woodrow

Wilson is most frequently credited

with providing a justification for

imposing democracy at the barrel

of a gun, rather than for creating a

world in which peace prevails and

war itself is rendered obsolete.

Andrew Bacevich observes,

“The key point is this: at the end of

the Cold War, Americans said yes

to military power. The skepticism

about arms and armies that

informed the original Wilsonian

vision, indeed that pervaded the

American experiment from its

founding, vanished. Political leaders,

liberals and conservatives

alike, became enamored with mili-tary

might” (p. 14). Much of the

balance of his book is devoted to

explaining how this happened.

One source of the new militarism

comes from the armed

forces themselves. Embittered

and disillusioned by their defeat in

Vietnam, the military was determined

to reinvent itself.

Personified by leaders such as

Creighton Abrams, the general

who succeeded William Westmoreland in Vietnam in 1968

and then went on to become Army

Chief of Staff, the military slowly

regained its self-confidence,

reforming itself in the process.

A principal goal of the restoration

was to reclaim the importance,

if not the primacy, of the military

in decision-making involving the

use of force. Only by realizing this

goal could the military be sure to

avoid future Vietnams. As annunciated

by the Weinberger Doctrine

during the first Reagan administration,

the new military doctrine

required several important tests for

the use of force: vital national

interests had to be at stake; clear

and achievable goals had to be set;

congressional and public support

was essential; and force was to be

used as a last resort and when used,

it was to fight in order to win. As

the doctrine evolved during Colin

Powell's watch, two new condi-tions

were added: an exit strategy

had to be in place; and victory was

to be assured by the application of

overwhelming force. Where such

force could not be applied, as in

Bosnia in the 1990s, Colin Powell

counseled against intervention.

The military's ultimate vindication

came with the swift victory

it achieved in the first Gulf War.

With that victory came a new

price. The military now argued

successfully that it had to be

equipped and able to win two such

wars concurrently. Congress was

enamored by the prowess displayed

in Gulf I, and the

administration and Congress

seemed only too happy to comply.

Unfortunately, the events

of the 1990s conspired against

the Powell Doctrine. None of

the numerous applications of

force during that decade met

the various tests Colin Powell

had put forward.

In following chapters,

Andrew Bacevich traces the

evolution of neo-conservative

thinking in the work of Norman

Podhoretz and later William

Kristol, which culminated in

advocacy of the overwhelming

use of force to implant

American ideals abroad; the

subtle effects of the shift from a

draft to an all-volunteer army

and the Reagan military

buildup; the glorification of

military virtues exemplified by

the 1986 movie “Top Gun” and

found in Tom Clancy's The

Hunt for Red October and later

novels; the vindication of

Vietnam War veterans personified

by the memorial erected in

Washington, D.C., in the early

1980s; the rise and growing

influence of the evangelical

religious right; the role of

strategic thinkers personified

by Albert Wohlstetter and

Andrew Marshall, ultimately justifying

the utility of the anticipatory

use of force in a new world

of precision weaponry; and, finally,

America's growing dependence

on—and therefore strategic right

to—Middle East oil. All of these

developments came together forming,

if you will, the tinder in the

box that Osama bin Laden ignited

with the 9/11 attacks in 2001.

What is to be done to counter

the negative effects of the new mil-itarism?

In his final chapter,

Andrew Bacevich urges us to keep

in mind ten fundamental principles

needed to restore the proper balance

in thinking about issues of

war and peace. He would have us

“heed the intention of the Founders

… revitalize the concept of separation

of powers … view force as a

last resort … enhance U.S. strategic

self-sufficiency … organize

U.S. forces explicitly for national

defense … determine an appropriate

gauge for determining the level

of U.S. defense spending …

enhance alternative instruments of

statecraft … revive the moribund

concept of the citizen-soldier …

reexamining the role of the

National Guard and the reserve

components … [and lastly] reconcile

the American military profession

to American Society.” All of

Professor Bacevich's principles

make sense within the interrelated

context of his ultimate mission: to

reorient the military to its proper

role in American, and indeed

world, society.

I have two criticisms of his

work. First, he fails to give adequate

attention on the causal side

to the civilian part of the equation:

the role that defense industries and

their highly effective lobbies in

Congress have played in the enormous

buildup of American power.

He quotes extensively from our

first military-civilian president,

George Washington, but he fails to

take account of, or even to mention,

the warning against the growing

influence of the military-industrial

complex from yet another

military-civilian President, Dwight

D. Eisenhower, in his final speech

to the nation in 1961.

Andrew Bracevich also gives

insufficient attention to the concept

of collective security, which is

implicit in another portion of

President Eisenhower's speech.

That wise warrior-president observed:

“Down the long lane of the history

yet to be written, America knows

that this world of ours, ever growing

smaller, must avoid becoming

a community of dreadful fear and

hate and be instead a proud

confederation of mutual trust

and respect.

“Such a confederation must be

one of equals. The weakest must

come to the conference table with

the same confidence as do we, protected

as we are by our moral, economic,

and military strength. That

table, though scarred by many past

frustrations, cannot be abandoned

for the certain agony of the battlefield.

Disarmament, with mutual

honor and confidence, is a contin-uing

imperative. Together we must

learn how to compose differences,

not with arms, but with intellect

and decent purpose. Because this

need is so sharp and apparent, I

confess that I lay down my official

responsibilities in this field with a

definite sense of disappointment.

As one who has witnessed the hor-ror

and the lingering sadness of

war—as one who knows that

another war could utterly destroy

this civilization, which has been so

slowly and painfully built over

thousands of years—I wish I could

say tonight that a lasting peace is

in sight.”

Alas, Dwight Eisenhower

could not say, just as we cannot say

today, that such an end is in sight.

This underlying concept, however,

was the bright side of the Wilsonian

dream that led to the creation of the

League of Nations, that led Franklin

Delano Roosevelt to create the

United Nations, and that Dwight

Eisenhower echoed in his prescient

remarks. Hard as it may be to

achieve, we should not abandon the

ef fort to find lasting peace. ❑

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